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72. The Working Group wishes to make the following recommendations:
(a) That, as soon as possible, the inter-agency working party should complete the study on the domestic criminalization of and enactment of legislation concerning activities related to mercenarism, adopting the broadest possible normative interpretation that includes not only the offence of mercenarism but also its new manifestations;
(b) That Chile should, without delay, take steps to accede to the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries;
(c) That the competent authorities, particularly in the military courts, should, without delay, complete investigations into the case still pending concerning the recruitment of private security guards to work in Iraq by the companies Neskowin and Global Guards;
(d) That urgent measures should be taken to protect the rights of Chilean citizens still in Iraq;
(e) That efforts should be made to promote the establishment of a body at the highest executive level - ministry or vice-ministry - endowed with authority and charged with monitoring both private security companies and new forms of mercenary activity;
(f) That steps should be taken to guarantee the universal right of all people to security as a public good through the adoption of a new private security act, which must incorporate the principles of efficiency - in relations between public and private sectors - and transparency, responsibility and accountability. The new act should also contain measures aimed at providing suitable training to officials responsible for private security (private armed guards and security guards) that includes: human rights, the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials and the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials of the United Nations, as well as the notion of equity in order to ensure the accessibility of security as a public good to the entire population;
(g) That steps should be taken to establish a mechanism, whether a parliamentary committee or a commissioner, with authority to monitor the activities of private security companies and to which complaints may be submitted;
(h) That, as soon as possible, steps should be taken to establish a national human rights institution that conforms to the Paris Principles and whose objective is the promotion and protection of human rights;
I) That consideration should be given to the possibility of organizing a multidisciplinary seminar in order to disseminate the findings of the inter-agency working party and the report on Chile by the Working Group on mercenaries, with a view to incorporating the recommendations of the seminar into public policy.
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[1] The Working Group refers to private military and private security companies as enterprises that provide all types of security assistance, training, procurement and consulting services, ranging from unarmed logistical support to armed guards participating in defensive or offensive military operations.
[2] The Working Group has requested invitations from Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras and Peru (E/CN.4/2006/11/Add.1, para. 23).
[3] Commission on Human Rights resolution 2005/2, para. 12 (e).
[4] See documents A/61/341, paras. 75 and 76, and A/HRC/4/42, paras. 36-59.
[5] See preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and general comment No. 31 of the Human Rights Committee on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
[6] Over the last few years, Chilean military personnel have reportedly lost not only political power but also economic power. A senior executive in a private enterprise is said to earn easily three times more than a senior officer in the army.
[7] According to information received by the Working Group, thousands of Chileans replied to the ads published in the Chilean press (the first of which was reportedly published in El Mercurio on 12 December 2003) and appeared in person at Pizarro’s offices. As a result, he was required to hire several job placement agencies to handle the selection process. Despite this, he is alleged to have previously already begun contacting active military personnel through former military colleagues, given that he had been a captain in the Chilean army, and through the alleged contacts of his sales director, Herman Brady Machiavello, son of the former minister of defence under General Pinochet.
[8] See document A/HRC/4/42/Add.1, paras. 18 and 29.
[9] J. Scahill, Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army,Avalon, New York, 2007, p. 207.
[10] Government of Chile, Ministry of National Defence Press Release, 21 October 2005.
[11] According to Pizarro, three Blackwater representatives evaluated in Chile the 300 former Chilean servicemen who had been selected. See J. Scahill, op. cit. (footnote 9 above), p. 197.
[12] One of Pizarro’s brothers, a former carabinero and ex-army lieutenant, Government of Chile, Ministry of National Defence Press Release.
[13] Since the institution of the actions against Pizarro, the Chilean criminal justice system has undergone reforms transforming it from an inquisitorial system into an accusatory system. The case before the ordinary courts will reportedly continue to be prosecuted under the former system of criminal procedure.
[14] A bill has been drafted to restrict the competence of the military courts and prohibit the prosecution of civilians under military law.
[15] A. Abelson, “Seguridad privada en Chile, tema pendiente para el Ministerio de Seguridad Pública”, Boletín del Programa de Seguridad y Ciudadanía,No. 6, August 2006. FLACSO, Chile.
[16] The consultancy firm of Jorge Lee Mira indicates that, in the past two years, the highest demand has come from the Metropolitan Region, which accounted for more than 46,000 security guards, followed by the regions of Maule (seventh region) and Valparaiso (fifth region).
[17] Leemira Consultores Asociados, “III Estudio Oferta de la Industria de Seguridad Privada en Chile”, Santiago de Chile, 2006.
[18] Interview with the director‑general of the carabineros, José A. Bernales Ramírez in the magazine, Chile Seguro.
[19] In 2003, the annual growth rate in Latin America was between 9 and 11 per cent (between 6 and 8 per cent in Europe and between 7 and 9 per cent in North America). A. Abelson, op. cit.(see footnote 15 above). According to Inter‑American Development Bank estimates, of the US$ 140,000 to 170,000 million (between 12 and 14 per cent of GDP), corresponding to the cost of armed violence in Latin America, the largest share is accounted for by private security services, which only the privileged classes can afford. Sources: J.L. Londoño et al ., Assault to Development: Violence in Latin America, Inter‑American Development Bank, Washington, D.C., 2000; “Crime, Violence and Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in the Caribbean. A Joint Report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank”, Washington, D.C., 2007.
[20] A. Abelson, op. cit. (footnote 15 above).
[21] Ibid.
[22] Private investigators, escorts and bodyguards are reportedly the largest unregulated sectors. Leemira Consultores Asociados, loc. cit. (footnote 17 above).
[23] The Working Group was not provided a copy of this manual.
[24] A. Abelson, op. cit. (footnote 15 above).
[25] See document E/CN.4/2004/80/Add.3.
[26] See Economic and Social Council, Official Records, 2005, Supplement No. 2 (E/2005/22‑E/C.12/2004/9, chapter IV, paras. 528 to 589).
[27] See report: “Undue process: Terrorism trials, military courts, and the Mapuche in southern Chile”.
[28] “La otra transición chilena: derechos del pueblo Mapuche, política penal y protesta sociales en un estado democrático”, March 2006.
[29] See document E/CN.4/2004/80/Add.3, para. 19.
[30] Those who benefit most are the private security companies and subcontracting firms. They reportedly divide among themselves the lion’s share of the original tendered contract with the Government of the United States of America for each Chilean “independent contractor”; see document A/HRC/4/42, para. 36.
[31] Private military and security companies do not consider the protection of convoys, buildings or individuals as direct involvement in hostilities.
[32] K. De Feyter and F. Gómez Isa, eds., Privatization and Human Rights in the Age of Globalization, Intersentia, Antwerp, 2005.
[33] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 19.
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