A second trait of rational choice that is often viewed as distinct from traditional sociological theory is the view of choice as an optimizing process. This is the sense in which choice is viewed as rational. It is important to note here that unlike classical microeconomics, contemporary sociological rational choice does not assume that income or profit is maximized. Hence, these rational choice theorists have moved far from the classical microeconomic assumption that individuals seek to maximize income, to recognition of the multiplicity of egoistic and altruistic goals that can direct behavior. This is the form of analysis that Jane Mansbridge (1990: 20-1) terms ‘inclusive’ modeling, because analysts ‘are in principle happy to abandon the claim that self-interest is the sole operative motive and willing to work with any motive, provided only that the decision-maker maximize and be consistent’. This is a category in which she includes herself. The category also includes contemporary sociological rational choice scholars. Furthermore, these scholars all view rationality as ‘bounded’, in the sense that decision-makers are seen as having limited information of uncertain validity, and limited abilities to acquire and process information – hence they have also moved far from the classic microeconomic assumption of complete information. Because of the boundedness of rationality, actors are frequently unable to anticipate the effects of their actions. Many of the consequences of their actions are therefore unintended. The result may be positive, as in invisible hand systems, or the result may be disaster.
Given the recognition that preferences need not exclude altruistic motivations and information need not be complete, the question remains as to whether conceptualizing choice as an optimizing process constitutes a point of essential differentiation between rational choice and traditional theory. Addressing this question requires an examination of the concept of purposive action shared by both approaches. Attribution of purpose to explain behavior involves a form of teleology. Two forms of ideological explanation can be distinguished (Elster, 1990). Objective teleology refers to processes such as Darwinian evolution, in which the appearance of purpose arises despite the absence of an intentional actor. For example, wings evolved as though their purpose were to fly. This is functionalist explanation. In contrast, subjective teleology refers to the actions governed by a system of values, goals, or aims, and hence to purposive action. This link between purposiveness and teleology is significant, because according to philosophers or science, any teleology implies some form of extremal principle (Nagel, 1953). This is a principle of maximization (for example, striving to attain a goal) or, what is the same thing from a formal standpoint, minimization (for example, striving to avoid falling short of a goal). Hence, purposive action entails maximization. The implication is that maximization principles are not merely used by rational choice theorists. They are also used implicitly by others who view behavior as purposive.
From a mathematical standpoint, the demonstration that purposive action entails maximizing assumptions should not be surprising, because in principle, any well-defined system can be described in maximizing terms. Hence the use of maximizing principles does not impose significant constraints upon an analyst. It merely requires that system dynamics be well described. The use of maximizing principles therefore does not constitute a point of essential differentiation between traditional and rational choice theory.
This examination of methodological individualism and optimization serves to emphasize the continuities between traditional and rational choice theory. This leaves us with the difference between traditional sociological theory and rational choice that they describe, that the latter makes explicit that which is implicit in the former.
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