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CONCLUSION

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By way of conclusion, let us consider critiques of rational choice. Four traditional critiques of rational choice are now widely recognized as misconceptions. First, rational choice is not wedded to a grim view of actors as ruthless opportunists. Indeed, much sociological rational choice analysis focuses on altruistic and other non-egoistic behaviors (Hechter, 1987). Secondly, rational choice is not wedded to any particular political position. Rational choice scholars range from free-market conservatives to Marxists (Elster, 1990). Thirdly, rational choice theory does not require that actions have only intended consequences; indeed, enormous emphasis has been placed on analyzing social dilemmas such as the prisoner's dilemma, in which individually rational actions combine to produce a collective loss. Finally, rational choice is not an alien import, but has deep roots within sociology, in particular the methodological individualism of Max Weber (Swedberg, 1998).

Other critiques remain contested. One that has gained increasing prominence during the past decade holds that rational choice scholars are so excessively concerned with abstract theory that they avoid the deep engagement with empirical data that is essential to any adequate analysis. This argument was put forth independently by Green and Shapiro (1994) in a critique of political science applications of rational choice, and by Johnson and Keehn (1994) in a critique of applications to area studies. Both critiques received wide attention and produced a debate that included a book-length response to Green and Shapiro (Friedman, 1995). In evaluating this debate, it is important to distinguish between critiques that bear directly on the theoretical approach, versus critiques that bear on particular applications. The former are more important, because even the best theoretic approaches can be applied badly.

When applications of rational choice in sociology are examined, what is striking are the numbers that are rich in empirical detail. This is consistent with the sociological tradition of deep engagement with empirical data. Examples include Jankowski's (1991) book Islands in the Street, in which he reports the results of more than a decade of ethnographic study of thirty-seven street gangs in Boston, Los Angeles and New York. This included, for example, studies of the choice to join a gang, which involved assessments by his ethnographic informants of a complex combination of costs and benefits. Costs included having to share income from criminal endeavors with other gang members, and a greater chance of being caught by police because greater numbers of persons would have detailed knowledge of the endeavor. Compensatory benefits included earnings that were more regular, less individual effort, smaller risk of physical harm when part of a gang action, protection for family members, and money for family emergencies. He studied the processes by which individuals climb the gang hierarchy and the alternative forms of gang hierarchies, which ranged from flat but rather autocratic structures, to steep and highly bureaucratized structures that included written bylaws and formal elections. An important focus of his analysis was the emergence and enforcement of norms within the gangs, focusing on issues such as trust, allocation of authority, and coordination. These norms limited violence and prédation within the gang, and forbade activities that would harm the relations with the community on which gang stability rests. Other empirically rich applications of rational choice in sociology include Hechter's (1987) analysis of group solidarity, Brinton's (1993) analysis of gender roles in Japan, Kiser and Schneider's (1994) analysis of premodern states, Opp's (1988) analysis of political protest, Nee's (1996) studies of development in China, Brustein's (1996) analysis of the social origins of the Nazi party, and Anthony et al.'s (1994) analysis of the ratification debate following the US constitutional convention of 1787. In light of such studies, it is surprising that the view of rational choice as theory obsessed has gained such support. However, the role of rational choice as the interlingua of the social sciences may provide the answer. The language of rational choice can serve as the basis for richly textured descriptions, however when it does so, the use of theoretically grounded terms also serves to point to the bodies of rational choice theory that would be relevant to an explanation. Hence, theory in rational choice analyses never can recede into the background, so a feature of rational choice descriptions that should be regarded as positive may be misjudged as a deficiency.

Rational choice theories are currently in a state of flux. This includes areas of theoretic development designed to broaden the perspective beyond its traditional limits. For example, rational choice has been criticized for ignoring emotions, but several distinct rational choice theories of emotion have now been proposed (Brams, 1997; Frank, 1988; Hirshleifer, 1987; Lawler and Yoon, 1998). Countering the view of rational choice as excessively rationalistic, rational choice theories of religion have also been proposed (Iannaccone, 1988; Stark 1999). Similarly, rational choice is sometimes criticized for treating preferences as fixed, and thereby ignoring preference change that is an important part of socialization, yet sociological rational choice theorists have offered several models intended to explain preference change (for example, see Lindenberg and Frey, 1993). Theories of socialization (Morgan, 1998; Yamaguchi, 1998) have also been proposed, and Rambo (1999) proposed a partial integration of rational choice and cultural sociology. Given the rate at which rational choice theory and applications are advancing, it is impossible at this time to offer a definitive assessment of its ultimate potential. However, two developments appear to be clear. First, a distinctively sociological form of rational choice analysis is in the process of development; a body of work that both reflects two important traditions within sociology, a substantive emphasis on norms and inequality and a commitment to deep engagement with empirical data. Second, this development will occur, not in isolation, but in a manner that draws upon and enriches theory-driven empirical research in other disciplines.




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