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Evidently wise to these considerations, Beijing has been careful to cultivate closer ties with Moscow and Chinese leaders now routinely make Russia the destination of their first overseas visit. Beijing’s attentions in this regard have been generally welcomed in Russia yet, until recently, there had remained reluctance about embracing China fully.
Part of the hesitance is explained by Russian discomfort at the rapid reversal of the countries’ relative positions. It is not uncommon, for instance, to hear it remarked in Moscow that, having once been China’s older brother, Russia now finds itself in the role of younger sister. This loss of pride is also accompanied by economic concerns. Above all, there is the worry that in exporting little more than raw materials to China, Russia is increasingly tying itself into a semi-colonial relationship. When it comes to international politics too, many Russian are anxious that Moscow’s longstanding influence over Central Asia is being eclipsed by that of Beijing. Others fear an eventual Chinese takeover of the Russian Far East. This would come either via uncontrolled migration into the sparsely populated area or by direct annexation of territories that were historically Chinese until the second half of the 19th century.
The implications of this situation for U.S. policy are clear. If Washington wishes to contain China and ensure that it does not succeed in achieving regional hegemony in East Asia, it must finds ways of exploiting Russian fears and of driving a wedge between Moscow and Beijing. This would have the effect of depriving China of its solid rear and, with every increase in uncertainty along the Russian-Chinese border, Chinese maritime ambitions would be scaled back. Such thinking will be criticized by many as a relic of a previous era. However, as noted by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan, East Asia is now in a “similar situation” to that of Europe prior to the First World War. This being so, if a rising China is to be stopped from challenging the international status quo, it may be time for a revival of some old-fashioned realpolitik.
Blind to this logic, Washington’s current policy is working directly against long-term U.S. strategic interests. By imposing sanctions on Russia and threating to arm Ukraine, the United States has inadvertently succeeded in getting Russian policymakers to abandon their lingering anxieties and to rush headlong into China’s supportive embrace. Just as damagingly, Washington has lent heavily on allies to follow its policy prescription. Most notably, Japan, having recognized the disastrous implications of a China-Russia alliance for its own interests, had been pursuing a rapprochement with Moscow and was beginning to develop security ties, clearly with a view to drawing Russia away from China. This sensible approach has had to be suspended, however, as Washington pressured Tokyo into joining the sanctions effort.
The effects of U.S. policy have been all too apparent as Russian-Chinese cooperation has accelerated rapidly since March 2014. With regard to overall political relations, during his state visit to Shanghai in May, Putin gushed that bilateral interactions had become the “best in all their many centuries of history.” Striking also was the Russian president’s frequent use of the term “alliance,” albeit not with reference to military ties. In addition to this positive rhetoric, it was during the May trip that Russia and China finally signed their mammoth 30-year, $400 billion gas deal. After more than ten years of inconclusive negotiations, it seems that Western sanctions helped break the impasse by pushing Russia to accept China’s price terms.
In the arms sector too, Russia has shown a new willingness to make concessions. Having previously denied China access to its most advanced weaponry due to concerns over theft of intellectual property, Russia has now agreed to sell Beijing the S-400 air-defense system and Su-35 fighter. These technologies will help China extend its defensive coverage and strike range, thereby strengthening its position with regard to Taiwan and the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. Further to weapons sales, bilateral naval cooperation has progressed and, following joint exercises in the East China Sea in May 2014, Russia and China agreed to conduct military drills in 2015 in the Mediterranean and Pacific. Last of all, sanctions have had a clear impact on Russian public opinion with attitudes towards China rapidly improving as those towards the West have soured. Indeed, according to an opinion survey conducted by the Levada Center in January 2015, a full 81 percent of Russians now regard the United States negatively whilst 80 percent have positive views of China. Each figure is the highest recorded in the history of the survey.
With the sanctions having gifted China so many benefits, Beijing must be privately cheering on Washington’s Russia policy.
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