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Perceived Public Attitudes. Especially for those negotiations that relate to central objectives and have high visibility, this lever type is of critical importance. The negotiator commonly hopes to convey the impression that his/her hands are tied, that public opinion is of such intensity and durability that only a formula close to the one being advanced could be acceptable politically. He/she will argue, conversely, that the publics of other participating actors could easily accept that same formula. The “public” in this case can refer to general public opinion, to ideological pressure groups, economic pressure groups, or ethnic pressure groups. Indeed, the latter are particularly valuable for bargaining purposes because they are likely to be able to claim credibly the ability to mobilize a large group of intensely concerned citizenry. The inability of U.S. negotiators in the Vietnam era to argue
Richard Cottam
plausibly that the American public would not accept defeat in Vietnam is a good example of the importance of this lever. In contrast, the dedication of the North Vietnamese public was apparent in their willingness to accept terrible punishment and to evince no sign of a waning commitment toward the achievement of a favorable outcome.
This focus is of particular importance because it relates exactly to the decisional latitude point made above. The Johnson and Nixon administrations in the Vietnam era did their best to alter the internal environment by producing a change in public attitudes, but they were unable to do so. A revealing example is provided by the Zionist pressure group with regard to U.S. negotiations concerning the Middle East. This pressure group is recognized both at home and abroad as having the ability to mobilize an intensely concerned citizenry. At home, it limits an administration’s range of choices for dealing with the Middle East. Yet, it can serve as the source of very strong leverage in negotiations with Arab governments. This lever type is certain to be a major factor in most systematic pictures of competing bargaining positions.
Perceived Possibility of Great Power Involvement. This kind of leverage is, of course, limited to negotiations involving participants other than the governments of great powers. It involves an implicit threat to allow events to proceed that will widen the scope of conflict by drawing into the conflict one or more major power. It will be effective, therefore, only if it is apparent that one (or more) of the parties would find its relative bargaining strength reduced were there to be major power involvement.
In particular, this would occur should one of the parties to the negotiations be perceived by others as having a close relationship with a major power that gave it a strong bargaining position with that power, a situation to be referred to below as a third country influence. For example, in negotiations between Ethiopia and the Sudan, in which Ethiopia wanted the Sudan to close its borders to an area in which an ethnic rebellion against Ethiopia was occurring, Ethiopian negotiators might well have reminded the Sudanese of Ethiopia's close friendship with the Soviet Union.
Awareness of Interdependence for Defense, for Economic Prosperity, and/or for the Achievement of Other Strategic Objectives. This lever type will be effective if there is an awareness of the importance of good relations among the parties to the negotiations
for the achievement of a variety of major objectives. There will be an advantage to one side if others see a similar asymmetry in the relative importance of good relations among them. In tacit bargaining, all that is called for is to sharpen the awareness of interdependence. The active counterparts to this tacit lever are potentially very strong levers, but applying them could have a long-term negative effect on the relationship. Thus, if the negotiating matter is not of critical importance, the tacit suggestion that a failure to agree to a particular formula could adversely affect the relations or, at the very least, lead to some unpleasant and tough bargaining, could constitute a strong lever.
Perceived Economic and/or Political Instability. This lever type, may well associate with the previous type. If a government recognizes an important interdependence with the government of another state, it will probably wish to see stability in that state. In such circumstances, if the government of the second state believes it is vulnerable to some serious instability, that government may well wish to make such danger known to its friend. If the two are engaged in serious negotiations (for example, for a new trade agreement or for an increase in military and technological aid), the government able to project a sense of instability may well have a strong advantage depending on the strength of the interdependence. This type of tacit bargaining is especially common in mentor/client relationships. The commonsensical assumption that, in such relationships, the economic aid given by the mentor is a source of leverage advantage is only rarely true. The irony of Sadat's diplomacy following the 1973 war, when Egypt's bargaining position was vastly enhanced, is that Sadat gave up most of his leverage advantage in return for friendship. Because the United States and Israel were both most anxious for Sadat to survive politically, the United States, with strong Israeli urging, granted the Sadat regime economic aid at a level thought necessary to satisfy the utilitarian demands of his constituency. The lever proved to be enduringly strong and was fully utilized by Sadat’ s successor, Husni Mubarak. This illustrates the point that power can be derived from dependence, as well as from dominance. The threat of collapse can be just as effective as “other-directed” forms of threat.
Perceived Long-Range Alterations, in Power Potential Ratings. If the government of a state is aware that negotiating partners expect that state to become more powerful, that expectation can be a
UNDERSTANDING NEGOTIATION: THE ACADEMIC CONTRIBUTION
source of leverage in tacit bargaining. The government of the state that is upwardly mobile, in capability terms, may be able to exact a higher price in negotiations because the negotiating partners want to be on good terms with the government of a state that can be expected to exercise increasing influence in world affairs. The People’s Republic of China (PRC, for example, cannot yet claim great power status on the basis of most conventional indicators. However, world expectations are that, within a generation, China will be at the great power level. Thus, China is able to exercise an influence greater than its current capability status would seem to justify. In tacit bargaining, the negotiator of the growing power need only make sufficient references to its growth and potential as a great power to ensure that its negotiating partners are fully aware of the point.
Perceived Risks to Personal Friendships of the Negotiators or of National Figures. This lever can be significant, particularly if the negotiators or national leaders have a great deal of decisional latitude. This is likely to be the case if the negotiations in question are not of central importance. In such cases, negotiators are likely to consider future negotiations of more importance in dealing with their counterparts. This is precisely an area in which personal style will decide how the lever is manipulated. The objective of the negotiator must be to highlight the value of improving relations or the potential jeopardy of a failure to agree without being explicit about either the promise or the threat. Regardless of one's particular style, however, the negotiator cannot afford to seem duplicitous if future effectiveness is important.
This lever is frequently underestimated in regard to the friendship of national leaders, but the decisional latitude point here is essential. If two leaders with an excellent personal relationship understand that both are tightly constrained by domestic politics in the range of alternatives they can consider, difficulty in achieving convergence on an acceptable formula is unlikely to harm the relationship. However, when decisional latitude is broad, the lever can be a powerful one. Anwar Sadat, for example, whose freedom in decision making was extraordinarily broad, was willing to take exceptional personal risks in negotiations with Jimmy Carter at Camp David. His desire to maintain close personal relations with the U.S. president gave a strong leverage to the U.S. side, and, apparently, the U.S. camp was quite willing to exploit it.14
Perceived Irrationality, Irresponsibility, or Instability
of Leadership. Thomas Schelling long ago pointed to the utility of appearing to be irrational for bargaining purposes. Richard Nixon allegedly tried deliberately to court an image of instability in his dealings with the North Vietnamese (the so- called "madman theory"). However, probably few leaders would want to project such an image to the world. Yet, some leaders have, in fact, acquired a reputation for instability and some, like Adolf Hitler, appeared to make conscious bargaining use of it. The nightmare for many is that of atomic weapons in the hands of a madman. First World observers are predisposed to see this lack of control in some Third World leaders. Idi Amin, Fidel Castro, and Mu’ammar Al-Qadhafi are perhaps the best examples. In 1962, the thought of nuclear weapons in Cuba falling under Castro’s control was an important dimension of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Undoubtedly, the bargaining advantage of someone perceived in this manner would be enviable. Threats to drop nuclear weapons would have a credibility that, for example, the dull bureaucratic leaders who often head the Soviet government could never achieve, even with nuclear equivalence. But, of course, such bargaining advantage would not be usable in all types of negotiations. In many situations, the lack of credibility could prove very costly at the negotiating table.
Perceived Likelihood of Accidental War. In some situations, in which the potential for escalation of conflict is perceived, this can be a very strong lever. However, in some—probably most—cases, it would not give either side much leverage. If, however, the probable damage to one party is much greater than to the other, there would be an advantage. Should this lever be combined with the previous type and the leadership of one government is seen to be adventurous to the point of irrationality, the advantage again would be substantial. In the era of nuclear weapons, the symmetrical leverage that has characterized the relationship between the Untied States and the Soviet Union may, indeed, have much to do with explaining the avoidance of "all-out" war.
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