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WHAT NEGOTIATION MEANS

Thomas Schelling in Arms and Influence, makes the bold assertion that “diplomacy is bargaining.”² Had he said simply that “diplomacy involves bargaining,” the statement would have been a truism and of little interest. As stated, it is seriously misleading; yet, a number of scholars, apparently in agreement with Schelling's assertion, look at negotiation largely (even exclusively) in terms of bargaining strategies. Their preferred approach is theoretical gaming, often concentrating on the zero-sum game. Their presumption is that an analysis of negotiation can be done within this most parsimonious of frameworks, one in which only a few select variables are considered, in which objectives (or values) can be translated quantitatively, in which the achievement of the objectives will be approached with full rationality, and in which information regarding variables and objectives is perfect.

Such presumptions are highly questionable. Most case studies seem to show that negotiations are characterized by great diversity in perception

UNDERSTANDING NEGOTIATION: THE ACADEMIC CONTRIBUTION

(and, it follows, in interpretations of what “information” is); by a broad range of values (most of which are held unconsciously and, hence, difficult to evaluate as to “rationality”); and by a need to accommodate the demands of several governments, each of which follows the dictates of an elaborately interactive foreign policy decision-making process.

The danger of such an approach is that it will bias the selection of cases to be investigated in favor of those it can reasonably handle. Further-more, this approach, in attempting to reduce the situation to its bare essence, may produce an apolitical bias, because most political variables will be purged in the interest of parsimony. Conflict Among Nations by Snyder and Diesing is a successful application of the approach in some carefully circumscribed cases.³ The authors conclude, nevertheless, that they needed to take a much harder look at the psychological milieu, and such an endeavor is most unlikely to lend itself to parsimonious analysis. The assumption of the game theory approach is that the structure of the negotiating situation can be teased out and that the analyst can then apply the appropriate bargaining strategy to that particular structure. Skeptics, who see an almost infinitely complex bargaining milieu in all but a few—usually low-level—cases, are unlikely to be convinced.

Another mode of approach is the psychologycal.⁴ This approach, however, has thus far been applied largely to individual negotiators to discern a psychological explanation for their negotiating style. The promise of using concepts drawn from psychology, such as perception and imagery, to examine a larger aspect of the milieu, has so far not been realized. Here, as elsewhere in the literature concerned with negotiation, conceptual development is in its infancy.

Then there is the considerable and growing literature of the "how to do it" genre. This style is best exemplified by the writings of Roger Fisher and those of I. William Zartman.⁵ This literature includes many impressive and sometimes brilliant essays. However, these writings tell us, in sum, that negotiators should be (like the authors) intelligent, socially sensitive, flexible, empathetic, and capable of achieving detachment in any negotiating situation. They are far more useful for the classroom than for instructing experienced practitioners.

Finally; a number of authors have identified general characteristics of the decisions and decisional styles that have led to success in negotiations. Zartman is particularly useful here.⁶ He makes the point that the decisional

style of negotiations is one of convergence and that the successful conclusion of negotiations occurs when a formula for resolution can be agreed upon. The contribution here is one of bringing conceptual clarity to the end product of the negotiating process. According to this approach, negotiations end successfully when there is a convergence of views around an acceptable formula. But the approach offers little help in explaining, for example, how to identify a preferred formula or the strategic elements necessary in achieving convergence around a chosen formula.

There is little doubt that the literature on negotiations serves an important educational function. Case studies, in particular, cover a broad range of situations, and the student is shown both the mistakes and the successes of negotiators attempting to deal with these situations. The generalized literature, in its attempt to discover some conceptual unity, is at the very least suggestive. Yet, one is left wondering whether the academic analyst has anything useful to say to the experienced negotiator. Or, far more important, does the academic analyst have anything to say that could lead to improvements in diplomatic negotiation even in the face of resistance from practitioners? The contention of this essay is that the answer to both questions should be affirmative. Furthermore, any progress made at the required level of abstraction would directly improve the teaching of negotiation.

However, although academic analysis can ultimately be of help to practitioners, that contribution will likely be primarily at a higher level of concern. Any contribution at lower levels will likely be rather modest. Academic analysis, for example, is unlikely to suggest any useful insights for the day-to-day interactions of those directly engaged in negotiating. Individuals who have risen to leadership positions as a result of much and varied experience have done so because of their skills in interpersonal relations. They have achieved the ability to understand an interactive situation of enormous complexity to the point of being able almost instantly to sense the implications of situational change when it occurs and, almost as quickly, to seek to manipulate the new situation to their own ends. Absorbed in the immediate task of negotiation and usually interested only in that which is directly relevant, such individuals are unlikely to consider seriously the broader political environment within which the negotiations are occurring. Whatever assumptions they have about that political context are likely to be implicit.

Ideally, the negotiator should test and reexamine

Richard Cottam

operating assumptions throughout the negotiating process. However, so all- consuming is the negotiating task that, far from testing and reexamining assumptions, the negotiator is more likely to be unaware of their importance in giving definition to what he or she sees as the negotiating environment. As a consequence, negotiators often fail to consider potentially damaging effects on the broader political environment and may ignore potentially damaging political consequences, including damage to the larger interests the negotiations were originally undertaken to serve. For example, in its determination to deny pipeline equipment to the Soviet Union in 1982, the Reagan administration came close to damaging the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance. Or, more common, the potential for achieving higher-level goals in a negotiation will go unnoticed. A rather extreme case in point is the now infamous negotiations with the Iranian government for the release of hostages held in Lebanon. Complicated secret negotiations designed to persuade the Iranians to use their influence to release the hostages resulted in a strengthening of an Iranian aggressive purpose that adversely affected basic U.S. objectives in the Persian Gulf area.

What academic analysis can provide is primarily a sense of context. Specifically, this involves the following: developing a means of identifying the operating assumptions of negotiators; explicating this largely implicit definition of the situation, including that of the broad political environment in which the negotiations are occurring; identifying and stating the broad foreign policy and strategic objectives directly relevant to the negotiating objectives; developing a means for charting the probable impact of various negotiating strategies on broader strategic objectives; suggesting means by which negotiating strategies could be adapted to test operating assumptions; constructing a picture of the full range of bargaining levers available to the negotiator; and assessing the fit of the available capability base and the negotiating objectives.