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Leverage Systems

As mentioned, the above is a checklist of levers that is reasonably inclusive, that is, all important lever types are included. It thus serves the analytic function of reminding the analyst of lever types that may be important in the negotiating context, but may have been overlooked. It should serve another purpose as well—that of allowing the analyst to view the negotiating process in terms of tacit and active bargaining activities.

But the primary analytic task is to go beyond a cataloguing of types of levers used and even an evaluation of their effectiveness. The task is to construct a series of dyadic leverage systems relating to the negotiations and related to one another via the third country lever. The purpose here is to gain an overview of the relative bargaining positions of the actors.

Because many of the identified levers complement each other and, in a number of cases, are tacit and active variants of the same lever type, it is particularly important that they not be viewed in isolation from one another. What the dyad should produce is two juxtaposed leverage positions from which a judgment can be made as to relative

potential advantage. Because this type of systematizing is not done naturally and even the most experienced negotiator will have overlooked important levers, it should be of particular value to the practitioner.

The analytic purposes to be served by the approach are: first, to construct a potential bargaining position; second, to devise an evaluative referent that describes what was seen, what was not seen, and what was only partially used; third, to provide a perspective for judging the extent to which the relative bargaining position predicted the actual outcomes; and, fourth, to provide a basis for constructing an alternate ideal bargaining strategy.

It is vital to remember that available levers are used or not used depending on the primary objective of the negotiators. The failure to make use of particular levers simply because they are available, in other words, should never be a basis for criticism. Ineffective use of levers or a failure to use an available lever that could well have helped move negotiations in the direction of a more preferred formula are reasonable grounds for criticism. The Sadat case, briefly referred to above, was one in which a leader consciously refused to make use of his available levers because he felt that by doing so he would be less likely to achieve his primary objective—ingratiating himself with the United States. Bargaining, Sadat felt, could be counterproductive for such an endeavor. Still, negotiators surely should have an acute awareness of the levers that are available: Far too frequently, they do not.