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Methodological individualism

Methodological individualism has been traditionally attacked within sociology because it undercuts the discipline's distinct area of investigation and threatens to dissolve it in favor of psychology. A commitment to at least some form of methodological individualism, in contrast, is often seen as a defining characteristic of rational choice (see Coleman, 1990: 5). The issue of methodological individualism is complex, so assessing and examining this issue requires clarification of terms. Joseph Schumpeter coined the term methodological individualism in 1908, though it was anticipated in the works of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill (Hodgson, 1986). The classic statement of methodological individualism is attributed to Ludwig von Mises (1949). He argues that social, economic, and other societal-level phenomena can only be adequately explained in terms of the actions of individuals. Societal-level phenomena can therefore be explained exclusively in terms of micro-level events. The opposite form of explanation, in which macro-level events affect the individual, is thereby excluded. As a result, in von Mises' view causality lies exclusively at the micro-level, and macro-level events are mere epiphenomena. This is a statement of what may be termed strict methodological individualism.

Methodological individualism is frequently confused with a less stringent position that Lukes (1968) terms ‘truistic social atomism’. According to Lukes, as its name implies, this position is expressed in truisms from which no reasonable person could dissent, such as ‘society consists of individuals’, and ‘institutions consist of people plus rules and roles’. Even methodological holists do not claim that social institutions take on a physical reality divorced from their constituent individuals. The Leviathan, after all, is only a metaphor. For example, by viewing persons as ‘empty vessels’ whose contents are provided socially, they thereby recognize that social and institutional action is ultimately individual action. There are also many intermediate conditions between strict methodological individualism and truistic social atomism. However, no consensus exists regarding the point on this continuum at which a departure from strict methodological individualism fails to constitute a form of methodological individualism.

Contemporary sociological rational choice scholars do not embrace the strict form of methodological individualism. For example, James Coleman (1990: 5) described himself as committed to a ‘special variant’ of methodological individualism. An examination of his analyses show that this variant is closer to truistic social atomism than to the strict position. For example, Coleman argues that macro-level events cannot be adequately explained in terms of other macro-level events, a position consistent with methodological individualism. However, when Coleman describes the ideal form of explanations of macro-level events he argues that such explanations should combine three types of propositions: macro-to-micro propositions which express the effects of societal level factors upon individuals; micro-to-micro propositions which describe micro-level processes; and micro-to-macro propositions which show how individual level events aggregate to produce societal level changes. Hence, for Coleman, micro-level processes serve as the intermediate terms through which macro-level events are causally linked, but contrary to strict methodological individualism, the analysis includes macro to micro propositions.

To find strict methodological individualists, one must look to economics, and yet even here the position is increasingly abandoned (for example, see Arrow, 1994). There are indications that even von Mises would have abandoned strict methodological individualism had he chosen to analyse sociological rather than economic problems. For example, he (1949: 41-2) states that ‘in the sphere of human action social entities have real existence. Nobody ventures to deny that nations, states, municipalities, parties, religious communities, are real factors determining the course of human events.’ Hence, at least within sociology and perhaps even somewhat beyond, truistic social atomism is the consensus position shared by rational choice and traditional theorists.