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Given the substantive overlap in core assumptions regarding actors and their relationship to structure of rational choice and traditional sociological theory, it might seem that the differences are inessential. As Hechter and Kanazawa (1997: 192) note, ‘many sociologists, like the character in Moire's Bourgeois Gentilhomme who was startled to learn that he was speaking prose, unwittingly rely on rational choice mechanisms in their own research’. Is rational choice then merely a new label, albeit a provocative and controversial label, by which to describe what may sociologists have been doing all along? Though exaggerating the discrepancy between the two would be a mistake, so too would it be a mistake to fail to appreciate the distinctiveness of rational choice.
What makes rational choice distinctive is that the conception of choice as an optimizing process is made explicit. It might seem that making an assumption explicit would be a minor matter. However, it has important implications, for it imposes a common structure on rational choice models. Each must specify a core set of theoretic terms, including (1) the set of actors who function as players in the system, (2) the alternatives available to each actor, (3) the set of outcomes that are feasible in the system given each actor's alternatives, (4) the preferences of each actor over the set of feasible outcomes, and (5) the expectations of actors regarding system parameters. Rational choice models can also vary along many dimensions. They may be expressed mathematically or discursively, they can correspond to one-shot games in which actor makes only a single choice, or processual models in which each actor's choices affect the conditions under which they and others will make subsequent choices, they may assume materially based instrumental preferences or include preferences for social approval, altruism, or justice; they may assume information is complete (that is, knowing the structure of the game, including others' preferences), perfect (that is, also knowing others strategies), or information may be incomplete and reflect either risk (that is, knowing the probability of occurrence for each uncertain event) or uncertainty (that is, not knowing these probabilities); they may include individual actors, corporate actors, or a combination of both types of actors. Despite such variations, due to the common structure of rational choice theories, they share a common theoretic vocabulary. It is this common vocabulary that permits rational choice to function as the interlingua of the social sciences, and ensures that theoretic developments in one substantive area will have implications in other substantive areas.
Due to the common structure of rational choice theories, analysis revolves around a limited set of issues. One central issue concerns the relationships among preferences. If individual preferences are convergent, the system is guided to optimality by an invisible hand, so individually rational actions lead to outcomes that are also collectively rational. However, such situations are rare empirically. In the absence of an invisible hand, everyone acting rationally could lead to an outcome that is collectively irrational, in that everyone is worse off relative to other feasible outcomes. Such situations, where a potential conflict exists between individual and collective rationality, are termed social dilemmas. A substantial part of rational choice theory concerns how actors resolve, or fail to successfully resolve, these dilemmas.
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