Excerpts from a Speech by Senator Joseph McCarthy
(•(. Today we are engaged in a final, all-out battle between Communisti c atheism an d Christianity. Th e moder n champion s of Communis m have selected this as the time. And, ladies and gentlemen, the chips are down—the y are truly dow n
Ladies an d gentlemen, can there be anyone here tonigh t wh o is so blind as to say
that th e war is not on? Can there be anyone wh o fails to realize that th e Communis t world has said, 'Th e tim e is now'—tha t this is th e tim e fo r th e show-dow n between the democrati c Christian world and the Communisti c athcistic world?
Th e reason why we find ourselves in a position of impotenc y is not because ou r only powerful potential enemy has sent me n to invade ou r shores, bu t rathe r be- cause of th e traitorou s actions of those wh o have bee n treated so well by this Na- tion. It has no t been the less fortunat e or member s of minorit y groups wh o have been selling this Natio n out, bu t rather those wh o have had all the benefits tha t the wealthiest natio n on earth has had to offer—th e finest homes, th e finest college ed- ucation, an d th e finest jobs in Governmen t we can give. This is glaringly tru e in th e State Department. Ther e th e bright young me n wh o are bor n with silver spoon s in their mouth s are th e ones wh o have been worst
In my opinio n the State Department, which is one of the most importan t govern- men t departments, is thoroughl y infested with Communists.
I have in my han d 57 cases of individuals wh o would appear to be either card carrying member s or certainly loyal to the Communis t Party, but wh o nevertheless are still helping to shape ou r foreign policy....
However th e moral s of ou r peopl e have no t been destroyed. The y still exist. This cloak of numbnes s an d apathy has only needed a spark to rekindle them. Happily, this spark has finally been supplied. ^
Source: Senator Joseph McCarthy, speech given February 9, 1950, in Wheeling, W.V., from C.ongressional
Record, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., February 20, 1954, 58-61.
tive, McCarthyism's equatio n of dissent with disloyalty ha d a chilling effect on thos e bot h withi n governmen t an d outside it wh o migh t have provide d constructive criticisms, al- ternative policy ideas, an d th e like. Th e kin d of self-examination tha t is essential fo r any successful policy process thu s was closed off.
14 6 C H. 4 The Cold War Context: Origins and First Stages
Summar y
Th e early Col d War years were a perio d of crucial choices fo r America n foreign policy. Th e policies pursue d in these years no t onl y addressed th e immediat e issues bu t also becam e th e foundation s an d framewor k fo r th e pursui t o f th e " 4 Ps" i n th e decades tha t followed. Containmen t an d nuclea r deterrence were th e central foreign policy doctrine s b y which America n powe r was exercised. Th e United Nation s was th e mai n political-diplomati c in - stitutiona l structur e fo r th e pursui t o f peace. Th e LIEO was th e mai n institutiona l struc - tur e fo r th e internationa l econom y an d th e pursui t o f prosperity. Anticommunis m was th e dominan t set of beliefs by whic h America n principles were said to be manifested. An d for - eign policy politics was marke d by a stron g consensus, even as America n political institu - tion s underwen t majo r changes i n their structur e an d interrelationship.
A numbe r of question s were raised, however, bot h at th e tim e an d in retrospect. Al- thoug h Col d Wa r strategy proponent s stressed th e complementarit y amon g th e fou r core national-interes t objectives, critics pointe d ou t tension s an d trade-off s tha t pitte d on e ob - jective against another: fo r example, strengthenin g th e Unite d Nation s vs. maximizin g America n power; pursuin g containmen t vs. bein g tru e t o principles. Concern s also were raised abou t th e domesti c political consensus, which, fo r all its benefits, also ha d a down - side in th e expansio n of presidential powe r an d violatio n of civil liberties.
These an d othe r issues woul d becom e mor e difficul t an d mor e controversial begin - nin g i n th e late 1960s an d continuin g throug h th e 1980s.
American Foreign Policy Onlin e Studen t StudySpac e 
• Wha t were the key elements of deterrence an d containment?
• Ho w well did they work?
• Is there somethin g to the revisionist views of th e origins of the Cold War?
For these an d other study questions, as well as other features, check ou t Chapte r 4 on th e
American Foreign Policy Online Student StudySpace at wwnorton.com/studyspace.
Notes
'Dean G. Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department (New York: Norton, 1969).
2Winston Churchill put it in very similar terms: "If Hitler invaded hell, I should at least make a favorable refer- ence to the Devil in the House of Commons." Both quotes cited in Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), 38.
Notes 14 7
'See, for example, Adam B. Ulam, The Rivals: America and Russia since World War II (New York: Viking, 1971); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Origins of the Cold War," Foreign Affairs 46.1 (October 1967); John Spanier, Amer- ican Foreign Policy since World War II (New York: Praeger, 1968).
4See, for example, Walter LaFeber, America in the Cold War (New York: Wiley, 1969); Thomas G. Paterson,
Meeting the Communist Threat: From Truman to Reagan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992).
5John Gerard Ruggie, "The Past as Prologue? Interests, Identity and American Foreign Policy," International Se-
curity 21.4 (Spring 1997): 100.
6Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1965); Martin J. Sherwin, "The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War: U.S. Atomic Energy Policy and Diplomacy," American Historical Review 78.4 (October 1973): 945-68.
7Martin J. Sherwin, "Baruch, Bernard Mannes," in Encyclopedia of U.S. Foreign Relations, Bruce W. Jentleson and
Thomas G. Paterson, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 1:135-36.
sPatrickM. Morgan, "Deterrence," in Encyclopedia of U.S. Foreign Relations, Jentleson and Paterson, eds., 3:10-16; Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960); Alexander L. George, "Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics," in The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 2d ed., Alexander L. George et al. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994), 7-12.
yX [George F. Kennan], "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs 25.4 (July 1947): 572, 575, 582.
10"NSC-68, A Report to the President Pursuant to the President's Directive of January 31, 1950," in U.S. De- partment of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1950 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), 1:240.
11 Cited in Thomas G. Paterson, "Korean War," in Encyclopedia of U.S. Foreign Relations, Jentleson and Paterson,
eds., 3:30.
12Quote from Lord Ismay, cited in David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Role in International
Security (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 52.
I3Jonathan Nashel, "Domino Theory," in Encyclopedia of U.S. Foreign Relations, Jentleson and Paterson, eds.,
2:32-33.
14Text of the legislation as passed by Congress, cited in Seyom Brown, The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Reagan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 124.
15Graham Allison, The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971);
Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Norton, 1969); James Blight and David Welch, eds., On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Re-examine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989); Don Munton and David A. Welch, The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Concise History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
16"Telegram, Secretary of State to the Consulate at Hanoi, May 20, 1949," in U.S. Department of State, Foreign
Relations of the United States: 1949 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), 7:29-30.
l7Melvin R. Laird, "Iraq: Learning the Lessons of Vietnam," Foreign Affairs 84.6 (November/December 2005): 31.
1 "Secretary of State Dean Acheson, cited in Thomas G. Paterson, J. Gary Clifford, and Kenneth J. Hagan, American
Foreign Relations: A History since 1895 (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1995), 369.
'''Cited in Paterson, Clifford, and Hagan, American Foreign Relations, 405.
2<)Many attribute this quotation to President Franklin Roosevelt. Although there are doubts as to whether he actually said it, few doubt that the statement captures the essence of U.S. policy. See Robert A. Pastor, Con- demned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 3.
2'"Address at a White House Reception for Members of Congress and for the Diplomatic Corps of the Latin
American Republics, March 13, 1961," in Public Papers of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy, 1961 (Washington, D. C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), 170-75.
14 8 C H. 4 The Cold War Context: Origins and First Stages
22Abraham F. Lowenthal, Partners in Conflict: The United States and Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1987), 30.
23Report of the Hoover Commission, cited in "Get Personal," New Republic, September 14 and 21,1998,11.
24Mark J. Gasiorowski, "Iran," in Encyclopedia of U.S. Foreign Relations, Jentleson and Paterson, eds., 2:415-16. See also James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Bruce R. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East (Princeton: Prince- ton University Press, 1980); Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979); Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Ter- ror (New York: Wiley, 2003); and Kinzer, Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq (New York: Times Books, 2006).
25Aaron Wildavsky, "The Two Presidencies," Trans-action 3 (December 1966): 8.
26Senator Fulbright titled the article quoted here "American Foreign Policy in the 20th Century under an 18th-Cen- tury Constitution" (Cornell Law Quarterly 47 [Fall 1961 ]). He wrote further: "The question we face is whether our basic constitutional machinery, admirably suited to the needs of a remote agrarian republic in the eighteenth cen- tury, is adequate for the formulation and conduct of the foreign policy of a twentieth-century nation, pre- eminent in political and military power and burdened with all the enormous responsibilities that accompany such power.... My question, then, is whether we have any choice but to modify, and perhaps overhaul, the eighteenth- century procedures that govern the formulation and conduct of American foreign policy" (1-2).
"Richar d F. Fenno, Jr., Congressmen in Committees (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), 71.
28Cited in James M. Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univer- sity Press, 1994), 22.
29Text of the legislation as passed by Congress, cited in Brown, Faces of Power, 124.
30The main precedent for the use of executive agreements rather than treaties as a way of getting around Con- gress had actually been set by Franklin Roosevelt in 1940 with the "destroyers-for-bases" deal with Britain (mentioned in Chapter 3). Even among those who agreed with Roosevelt's objectives, there was some con- cern at the time about the precedent being set. This also was the view taken in a 1969 report by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "Had the president publicly acknowledged his incursion on the Senate's treaty power and explained it as an emergency measure, a damaging constitutional precedent would have been averted. Instead, a spurious claim of constitutionality was made, compounding the incursion on the Senate's authority into a precedent for future incursions." Cited in Loch K. Johnson, America as a World Power: For- eign Policy in a Constitutional Framework (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991), 108-9.
3,Based on data from Michael Nelson, ed., Congressional Quarterly's Guide to the Presidency (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1989), 1104.
32There actually was one major effort in the early 1950s to rein in executive agreements. This was the Bricker
Amendment, named for its principal sponsor, Senator John W. Bricker (R-Ohio), which would have amended the Constitution to require congressional approval of all executive agreements. Support for the Bricker Amendment was in part a reflection of McCarthyite distrust of the executive branch, and it too faded with the overall discrediting of McCarthyism. Indeed, until the late 1960s little was heard even about the executive's taking full advantage of the lack of any deadline in the requirement that executive agree- ments be reported to Congress, reporting very few of these agreements—and even those in a not particu- larly timely manner.
33Loch K. Johnson and James M. McCormick, "Foreign Policy by Executive Fiat," Foreign Policy 28 (Fall
1977): 121.
34Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977).
Notes 14 9
35See, for example, James G. Blight and Peter Kornbluh, eds., Politics of Illusion: The Bay of Pigs Invasion Re- examined (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1997); "A Perfect Failure: The Bay of Pigs," in Groupthink: Psycho- logical Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, 2d ed., Irving L. Janis (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982),
14-47; Peter Wyden, Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story (New York: Simon 8c Schuster, 1979).
36Cited in Janis, Groupthink, 39.
37Peter Kornbluh, ed., Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba (New York: Norton, 1998).
38Cited in Janis, Groupthink, 16.
39Allison, Essence of Decision; Blight and Welch, On the Brink; Munton and Welch, Cuban Missile Crisis.
40Allison, Essence of Decision; Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1974); Morton H. Halperin and Arnold Kanter, eds., Readings in American For- eign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973); David C. Kozak and James M. Keagle, Bureaucratic Politics and National Security: Theory and Practice (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1988). The movie Thirteen Days, released in 2000, had some inaccuracies but did provide a clear and vivid portrayal of the strong leadership President Kennedy provided. The movie was based on a book by the same name written by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, the president's brother and his main confidante during the Cuban missile crisis. See Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days (New York: Norton, 1971).
41Dan Caldwell, "A Research Note on the Quarantine of Cuba, 1962," International Studies Quarterly 21.2 (De- cember 1978): 625-33; Joseph F. Bouchard, Command in Crisis: Four Case Studies (New York: Columbia Uni- versity Press, 1991); Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises, 2d ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Scott D. Sagan, "Nuclear Alerts and Crisis Management," International Security 9.4 (Spring 1985): 99-139; Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, eds., The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997); Sheldon M. Stern, The Week the World Stood Still: Inside the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005); and Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2d ed. (New York: Longman, 1999).
42Richard K. Betts, "Is Strategy an Illusion?" International Security 25.2 (Fall 2000): 34-35; Scott D. Sagan, The
Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1993), chaps. 2-3.
43James Aronson, The Press and the Cold War (New York: Bobbs Merrill, 1970), 186.
44Aronson, The Press and the Cold War, 159.
45Aronson, The Press and the Cold War, 159-60.
46"Commencement Address at American University in Washington," June 10,1963, in Public Papers of the Pres- idents: John F. Kennedy, 1963 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), 459-64.
47Quoted in Bruce W. Jentleson, Pipeline Politics: The Complex Political Economy of East-West Energy Trade
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), 129.
48Jentleson, Pipeline Politics, 100.
49Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes, and Kyrill M. Anderson, The Soviet World of American Communism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); Ronald Radosh and Joyce Milton, The Rosenberg File (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).
50Cited in Jerel A. Rosati, The Politics of United States Foreign Policy (New York. Harcourt, Brace, 1993), 285.
Дата добавления: 2015-09-11; просмотров: 69 | Поможем написать вашу работу | Нарушение авторских прав |