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Col d Wa r nuclea r deterrenc e doctrin e i s a particularl y stron g exampl e o f theor y shapin g policy. Its developmen t involve d a "smal l grou p o f theorist s [who ] woul d devis e an d hel p implemen t a set o f idea s tha t woul d chang e th e shap e o f America n defens e policy," an d wit h th e highes t stakes o f possibl y meanin g "th e differenc e be - twee n peac e an d tota l war." Thes e theorist s wer e seen a s "th e wizard s o f Armaged - don, " a grou p impressiv e i n its intellect, developin g sophisticate d an d mysteriou s theorie s an d strategies, geare d t o avoidin g th e horror s o f nuclea r war.*
Th e nuclea r age change d th e natur e o f deterrence. Wherea s i n th e past, coun - trie s coul d strategiz e t o wi n war s i f deterrenc e failed, nuclea r wa r coul d no t b e won. Scholar s an d strategist s wh o ha d studie d nava l fleets, armies, an d even air powe r no w ha d t o develo p theorie s an d policie s geare d mor e t o deterrin g tha n t o winnin g wars. "Tota l nuclea r wa r i s t o b e avoide d a t all costs," Bernar d Brodi e wrote. "[S]uc h a war, even i f w e wer e extraordinaril y lucky, woul d b e to o big, to o all-consumin g t o permi t th e surviva l eve n o f thos e fina l values, like persona l freedom, fo r whic h
alon e on e coul d thin k o f wagin g it."1
Brodi e an d hi s colleague s wer e a colorfu l group. Brodi e ha d bee n a politica l sci- enc e professo r a t Yale; h e "hardl y seeme d th e typ e t o becom e th e pionee r o f nuclea r strateg y... short, wit h glasses... awkwar d... badl y dressed." The n ther e wa s Al- ber t Wohlstetter, a mathematician, u p unti l the n " a rathe r otherworldl y figure, " i n th e home-buildin g busines s fo r a while. H e late r woul d becom e a professo r a t th e Universit y o f Chicago, wher e amon g hi s student s woul d b e Pau l Wolfowitz, a lead - in g neoconservativ e i n th e Georg e W. Bus h administration. * Wohlstetter' s mai n wor k wa s o n th e nee d fo r assure d second-strik e capabilities, tha t is, ensurin g tha t eve n i n a case o f surpris e attac k o r othe r Soviet firs t strike, th e survivin g America n nuclea r force s woul d still b e sufficien t t o credibl y threate n retaliatio n severe enoug h t o destro y th e Soviet Union. Thi s wa s less actuall y t o figh t a nuclea r wa r tha n t o strengthe n deterrenc e throug h fea r o f retaliatio n eve n a s a secon d strike.
Mos t colorfu l of all was Herma n Kahn, a physicist, "brazenl y theatrical, long - winded, overflowin g wit h a thousan d an d on e ideas."§ Kahn's concer n was whethe r th e threa t t o retaliate ever coul d b e sufficiently credible t o convinc e th e othe r side tha t Americ a woul d d o i t even a t th e risk o f annihilatin g th e huma n race. H e speculated o n whethe r th e Unite d States neede d a "Doomsda y machine " tha t woul d b e programme d
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12 2 C H. 4 The Cold War Context: Origins and First Stages
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for automatic massive nuclear retaliation without th e huma n factor, the president or anyone else, coming back into the decision. He to o argued that this would strengthen deterrence, make nuclear war less likely. Th e Doomsday machine an d Kahn became the basis for the 1962 movie Dr. Strangelove, directed by Stanley Kubrick an d starring Peter Sellers, controversial at the time and later a film classic.
The leading thin k tank for these and other nuclear theoretician-strategists was the RAND Corporation. RAND was the Pentagon's mai n semi-outside think tank. Its loca- tion near the beaches of Santa Monica, California, provided a setting at once conducive to big thinking yet also in its serenity starkly contrasting with scenarios of nuclear war an d deterrence. RAND ha d extensive influence in every administration in this era, es- pecially the Kennedy administration, when Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara brough t RAND scholars into government as par t of his team of "defense intellectuals." The wizards no w had responsibility for helping avoid Armageddon.
*Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 11.
tSee Reading 4.2.
*Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, 11-12,94.
^Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, 220.
Soviet power," Kennan argued; it migh t even reveal th e internal contradiction s of their system to th e poin t tha t th e Soviet Unio n woul d "break up."9
The Formative Period, 1947-50
Both deterrence an d containmen t were evident in Truma n administratio n foreign poli- cies. Th e Truman Doctrine, proclaime d in Marc h 1947, was essentially a U.S. commit - men t to aid Greece an d Turkey against Soviet an d Soviet-assisted threats. Th e U.S. aid was economic, no t military, an d it totaled only abou t $400 million. But th e significance, as President Truma n stressed in his historic speech to Congress an d th e nation, was muc h mor e sweeping (see "At th e Source," p. 123). This was no t just anothe r foreign policy issue involving a couple of importan t bu t mino r countries. It was a defining momen t in histor y wit h significance fo r th e fate of th e entire post-Worl d War II world. And th e Unite d States was th e only countr y tha t could provide th e necessary leadership.
A few month s later th e Marshall Plan was announce d in a commencemen t speech at Harvar d University by Secretary of State George Marshall (see "At the Source," p. 123). Most of Western Europ e still ha d no t recovered economically fro m th e devastation of Worl d War II. In France, Italy, an d elsewhere, communis t parties were gaining suppor t by
Power: Nuclear Deterrence and Containment 12 3
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