Читайте также:
|
11 4
Introduction: "Present at the Creation" 11 5
Differen t views o n thes e question s are reflecte d i n th e debat e over th e origin s of th e Cold War. This debat e is marke d by two mai n schools of thought, th e orthodo x an d th e revisionist. Th e orthodox view put s principa l responsibilit y squarel y o n th e shoulder s o f Josef Stalin an d th e Soviet Union. 3 Thi s view ha s bee n strengthene d b y revelation s i n recen t years fro m Soviet an d othe r archives. "We no w know," th e his- toria n Joh n Lewis Gaddi s contends, tha t "as lon g a s Stalin was runnin g th e Soviet Union, a cold wa r was unavoidable. " Th e Soviets use d th e Red Arm y to mak e Easter n Europ e thei r ow n spher e o f influence. The y sough t t o subver t government s i n Wester n Europe. The y blockade d West Berlin i n a n effor t t o forc e th e Unite d States, France, an d Britai n out. I n Asia the y supporte d th e Chines e communist s an d helpe d star t th e Korea n War. The y supporte d communis t partie s i n Southeas t Asia an d Latin America, an d withi n Africa n anticolonia l movements; indeed, on e o f th e fundamenta l tenet s o f Soviet communis t ideolog y was t o aid revolutio n everywhere. An d i n th e Unite d States the y ra n a majo r spy rin g trying, amon g othe r things, t o steal th e secret o f th e atomi c bomb.
In th e revisionist v iew of th e origins of th e Cold War, as represente d in Reading 4.1, th e Unite d States bears its ow n significan t share of th e responsibility.4 Som e revisionists see th e Unite d States as seeking its ow n empire, fo r reasons of bot h Power an d Prosper - ity. Its method s ma y have bee n less direct an d mor e subtle, bu t its objectives neverthe - less were dominatio n to serve America n gran d ambitions. In citing evidence fo r U.S. neo-imperialis t ambitions, these critics poin t as far bac k as th e 1918-1 9 U.S. "expedi- tionar y force " that, alon g wit h Europea n forces, intervene d i n Russia t o tr y t o reverse th e Russian Revolution. Othe r revisionists see th e proble m mor e as on e of U.S. miscal- culation. The y maintai n tha t th e Soviets were seeking little mor e tha n t o ensur e thei r ow n securit y by preservin g Polan d an d Eastern Europ e as a cordon sanitaire to preven t futur e invasions of Soviet soil. Wha t transpire d in thos e early post-Worl d War II years, these revisionists argue, was akin to th e classic "securit y dilemma, " ofte n presen t in in - ternationa l politics, in whic h each side is motivate d less by aggression tha n by th e fear tha t th e othe r side canno t b e trusted, an d thu s sees its ow n action s a s defensive while th e othe r side sees the m as offensive. Ha d U.S. policy bee n mor e on e of reassuranc e an d cooperation, rathe r tha n deterrenc e an d containment, ther e migh t no t have bee n a Col d War.
Wit h thi s debat e i n mind, i n thi s chapte r an d th e nex t w e analyze th e dynamic s o f foreig n polic y choice fo r th e Unite d States as played ou t durin g th e Cold War, wit h re- gard to bot h foreign policy strategy an d foreign policy politics. In so doin g we will gain a deepe r understandin g o f th e Col d War itself an d provid e th e contemporar y contex t t o g o wit h th e historica l on e (fro m Chapte r 3) fo r th e challenges an d choices tha t face th e Unite d States i n th e post-Col d War era.
11 6 C H. 4 The Cold War Context: Origins and First Stages
Peace: Internationa l Institutionalis m an d th e Unite d Nation s
Wor k on th e Unite d Nation s (UN) was begu n well befor e Worl d War II was over. On e of th e primar y reasons tha t Worl d War I ha d no t turne d ou t t o b e "th e wa r t o en d all wars," a s Woodro w Wilso n an d othe r leaders ha d hoped, was th e weakness o f th e League of Nations. Frankli n Roosevelt an d othe r worl d leaders felt the y ha d learne d fro m tha t experience, an d this tim e intende d t o create a stronge r global bod y a s th e basis fo r a stable peace.
The Original Vision of the United Nations
Th e gran d hop e for th e United Nations, as articulated by FDR's secretary of state, Cordell Hull, was tha t "there woul d no longer be nee d fo r spheres of influence, fo r alliances, for balance of power, or any othe r special arrangement s throug h which, in th e unhapp y past, nation s strove to safeguard their security or promot e their interests." Thei r vision was of "one world " an d a peace tha t was broa d an d enduring.
Thi s was quintessentia l International Institutionalism, a vision of internationa l re- lation s in whic h th e nationa l interest of th e Unite d States, as well as th e nationa l inter - ests o f othe r nations, woul d b e served best b y multilatera l cooperatio n throug h internationa l institutions— a worl d tha t coul d be, i n th e metaphor s cited bac k i n Chap - te r 1, th e "cultivable garden " of peace, no t necessarily th e "global jungle " of power. Th e Unite d States, mor e tha n any othe r country, saw th e worl d i n these term s an d pushe d fo r th e creatio n o f th e UN. I t was i n San Francisco o n Jun e 26,1945, tha t th e U N Char - te r was signed (with fifty-on e original signatories). Ne w York City was chose n as th e lo- catio n fo r U N headquarters.
Th e lesson draw n fro m th e failure of th e League of Nations was no t tha t th e Interna - tional Institutionalist strategy was inherently flawed, bu t tha t th e post-Worl d War I ver- sion of it ha d two crucial errors. On e was U.S. nonmembership. FDR kne w tha t America n membershi p was key t o th e UN an d tha t th e UN was necessary i n orde r tha t th e United States no t revert to isolationism. U.S. membershi p in th e UN thu s was "an institutiona l tripwire," as Joh n Ruggie calls it, "tha t woul d force America n policymakers to take posi- tion s on potential threats to internationa l peace an d security... no t simply to look th e othe r way, as they ha d don e in th e 1930s."5 FDR was determine d no t to make th e same political mistakes tha t Woodro w Wilson ha d made. Roosevelt worked closely wit h Con -
gress, including giving a majo r role in th e U.S. delegation to th e San Francisco Conferenc e to senior Republicans such as Senator Arthu r Vandenberg of Michigan. He also used his "fireside chats" an d othe r political technique s to ensure tha t publi c opinio n supporte d th e UN. All this wor k paid off: th e Senate vote on U.S. membershi p in th e UN was 89-2,
Peace: International Institutionalism and the United Nations 11 7
an d public-opinio n polls showed tha t 66 percent of American s favored U.S. membershi p an d only 3 percent were opposed (31 percent were uncertain).
Following th e second lesson draw n fro m th e interwa r years, world leaders strove to ensure tha t th e U N woul d b e a stronger institutio n tha n th e League ha d been. Having th e United States as a membe r was par t of this plan, bu t so was institutional design. Th e League ha d allocated roughly equal powers to its Assembly, comprisin g all membe r na - tions, an d to its Council, mad e up of permanen t seats fo r th e fou r "great powers" tha t were League member s (Britain, France, Italy, an d Japan) an d fou r seats to be rotate d amon g othe r membe r nations; all seats on th e Counci l were equally powerful. In contrast, th e UN gave its Security Counci l muc h greater authorit y tha n its General Assembly. Th e UN Security Council could authoriz e th e use of militar y force, orde r th e severance of diplomati c relations, impos e economi c sanctions, an d take othe r actions an d mak e the m bindin g o n membe r states. An d th e fiv e permanen t member s o f th e Security Council — th e Unite d States, th e Soviet Union, Britain, France, an d China—wer e mad e particularly powerful, being given th e powe r to veto any Security Counci l action.
Th e UN Charte r even envisioned a standing UN military force. Article 43 of th e char- ter ha d called on "all Members... to make available to th e Security Council, on its call an d with special agreement or agreements... [to be] negotiated as soon as possible... arme d force, assistance an d facilities... necessary for th e purpos e of maintainin g internationa l peace an d security." This standing force was to be directed by a Military Staff Committee, consisting of th e chiefs of staff of th e arme d forces of th e permanen t member s of th e Secu- rity Council. Th e Military Staff Committe e woul d directly advise th e Security Council an d be in operational charge of th e military forces. No Article 43 agreements were ever con- cluded, however. Over th e years th e UN has raised temporar y military forces fo r particular missions such as peacekeeping, bu t it has never ha d a permanen t standing military of its own. I n this an d othe r respects, althoug h makin g importan t contributions, th e U N did no t prove able to provide th e institutional infrastructur e fo r a "one world " peace.
The Scaled-Back Reality
On e reason th e UN was unable to ensure peace was th e political ambivalence of a numbe r of countries, including th e United States, tha t wante d an international institutio n strong enoug h to help keep th e peace bu t no t so strong as to threate n nation-stat e supremac y or sovereignty. Althoug h Roosevelt an d Truma n administratio n officials ha d helped write th e Article 43 provision int o th e UN Charter, man y in Congress saw it as a step to o far toward "world government." The y supporte d th e UN, bu t no t tha t much, an d ha d th e power o f th e purse an d othe r legislative authorit y to ensure tha t no American troop s woul d be pu t unde r any sort of permanen t UN command. Congress demonstrate d similar reticence wit h the Genocide Conventio n ("convention" is used here as a synony m for treaty) an d th e Universal Declaration of Huma n Rights (UDHR). Th e goals of preventing genocide an d
11 8 C H. 4 The Cold War Context: Origins and First Stages
promotin g huma n rights obviously were nonobjectionable. But the U.S. Senate refused for years to ratify the Genocide Convention an d gave only selective recognition to the UDH R because these document s ostensibly risked giving th e UN an d international courts juris- diction over American domestic affairs in a manne r tha t threatened American sovereignty. We will come back to this issue of international institutions versus national sovereignty in Part II of this book, fo r it has resurfaced as a majo r debate in post-Col d War foreign policy. The poin t here is tha t this issue was present even in the original gran d vision of th e UN.
Th e other, mor e importan t reason tha t th e UN fell shor t of its original vision was th e onset of th e Cold War an d th e resultant priorit y given to consideration s of Power. Even befor e th e UN Charte r was signed, U.S.-Soviet tensions ha d flared over th e futur e of Poland an d othe r states of Eastern Europe. It also was only weeks after th e signing of th e U N Charte r tha t th e United States droppe d th e world's firs t atomi c bomb s o n Japan. Pres- ident Harr y Truma n defende d his A-bom b decision as th e only alternative to a majo r an d risky invasion, bu t som e critics believed it was less abou t getting Japan to surrende r an d establishing peace tha n abou t demonstratin g America n military migh t so as to intimidat e
th e Soviet Union. 6 Whichever interpretatio n on e took, th e tensions tha t arose durin g this
tim e demonstrate d th e limits of the UN fo r managin g key internationa l events an d ac- tions. This weakness was confirme d by th e controversy in 1946 over th e Baruch Plan. Name d for Truman' s adviser Bernard Baruch, th e plan was a U.S. proposa l to th e UN Atomi c Energy Commissio n fo r establishing internationa l control of nuclear weapons. Th e Soviet Unio n rejected th e Baruch Plan. Some cited this as evidence of Stalin's non - peaceful intentions. Other s assessed th e Baruch Plan as on e sided an d actually intende d to spu r a rejection. 7
In othe r ways as well, instead of a unifyin g institutio n th e UN becam e yet anothe r foru m for th e competitio n between th e United States an d th e Soviet Unio n an d their re- spective allies. The y differed over wh o shoul d be secretary-general. The y disagreed on which countrie s woul d be admitte d to th e General Assembly. Each used its veto so man y times tha t th e Security Council was effectively paralyzed. At on e point, following th e Oc- tobe r 1949 communis t triump h in th e Chinese civil war, th e Soviets boycotted th e Secu- rity Council in protes t against its decision to allow Jiang Jei-shi (Chiang Kai-shek) an d his anticommunis t Nationalist government, which ha d fled to th e island of Taiwan, to continu e to hol d China's UN seat. In fact, on e of th e few times th e Security Council did act decisively in these early years was in June 1950, whe n communis t Nort h Korea in- vaded South Korea, setting off the Korean War: Th e United States too k advantage of th e Soviet boycott of th e Security Council to get a resolution passed creating a UN-sponsore d military force to defen d South Korea.
American s ofte n view th e United Nation s as mor e hostile tha n friendly. In later chap - ters, we address this idea as it pertain s to th e contemporar y era. Durin g th e early Cold War era, though, as th e table in "Internationa l Perspectives" on page 119 shows, th e UN was quite supportiv e of America n foreign policy. Even so, as an internationa l institutio n it
Power: Nuclear Deterrence and Containment 119
INTERNATIONA L PERSPECTIVE S
Дата добавления: 2015-09-11; просмотров: 67 | Поможем написать вашу работу | Нарушение авторских прав |