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THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
CdThe Parties to this Treaty... seek to promot e stability an d well-being in the
Nort h Atlantic area
Art. 3. In orde r mor e effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Par- ties, separately and jointly, by mean s of continuou s and effective self-help and mu - tual aid, will maintai n an d develop their individual and collective capacity to resist arme d attack
Art. 5. Th e Parties agree tha t an arme d attack against on e or mor e of the m in Europ e or Nort h America shall be considered an attack against the m all; and conse- quently they agree that, if such an arme d attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charte r of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties, [taking] such actions as it deem s necessary, including the use of arme d force, to restore an d maintai n the security of the Nort h Atlantic area
Signed in 1949 by twelve founding members: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Ice- land, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Source: Department of State Bulletin 20.507 (March 20, 1949).
wo n China's civil war. No w China, th e world's mos t populou s country, joine d th e Soviet Union, th e world's largest, as communism' s giant powers. "Red China," fo r man y Ameri - cans, seemed a n even mor e ominou s enem y tha n th e Soviet Union.
These developments prompte d a reassessment of U.S. strategy. NSC-68, a seminal security-planning paper developed in early 1950 by President Truman's National Security Council, called for three importan t shifts in U.S. strategy (see "At th e Source," p. 126). First, there needed to be a globalization of containment. The threat was no t just in Europe an d Asia, bu t everywhere: "the assault on free institutions is world-wide now."10 This mean t tha t U.S. commitment s ha d to be extended to span the globe. Allies needed to be defended, vital sea lanes protected, an d access to strategic raw materials maintained. Part of th e rationale was also psychological: th e concern that a communis t gain anywhere would be perceived mor e generally as the tide turnin g in their favor an d thu s would hur t American credibility.
Second, NSC-68 propose d a militarization of containment. Th e Truma n Doctrin e an d th e Marshall Plan were largely diplomati c an d economi c measures. Wha t was neede d
12 6 C H. 4 The Cold War Context: Origins and First Stages
A T TH E SOURC E
NSC-68
<»: Th e fundamenta l design of those wh o control the Soviet Union an d the interna- tional communis t movement... calls for the complete subversion or forcible destruc- tion of the machiner y of government an d structure of society in the countries of the non-Soviet world an d their replacement by an apparatu s an d structure subservient to an d controlled fro m the Kremlin. To tha t en d Soviet efforts are no w directed toward th e dominatio n of the Eurasian land mass. The United States, as the principal center of power in th e non-Soviet world an d bulwark of opposition to Soviet expansion, is the principal enemy whose integrity and vitality mus t be subverted or destroyed by one means or anothe r if the Kremlin is to achieve its fundamenta l design.
Th e Soviet Unio n is developing th e militar y capacity to suppor t its design fo r world dominatio n
A mor e rapid build-u p of political, economic, an d military strength an d thereby of confidence in th e free world tha n is no w contemplate d is th e only course which is consistent wit h progress toward achieving ou r fundamenta l purpose. Th e frustra - tio n of th e Kremlin design requires th e free world to develop a successfully func - tionin g political an d economi c system an d a vigorous political offensive against th e Soviet Union. These, in turn, require an adequat e military shield unde r which they can develop. It is necessary to have th e militar y power to deter, if possible, Soviet ex- pansion, an d to defeat, if necessary, aggressive Soviet or Soviet-directed actions of a limited or total characterUnless ou r combine d strength is rapidly increased, ou r allies will ten d to becom e increasingly reluctant to suppor t a fir m foreign policy on ou r par t an d increasingly anxious to seek othe r solutions, even thoug h they are aware tha t appeasemen t mean s defeat
Th e whole success of th e propose d progra m hangs ultimately on recognition by this Government, th e American people, an d all free peoples, tha t th e cold war is in fact a real war in which th e survival of th e free world is at stake. '
Source: Text of memorandum no. NSC-68, from U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
United States 1950, 1: 237-39.
no w was a broa d an d extensive militar y buildup: a global ring of overseas military bases, military alliances beyon d NATO, an d a substantial increase in defense spending. Th e lat- ter ha d to be pursued, th e NSC-68 strategists stressed, even if it mean t federal budge t deficits an d higher taxes.
Power: Nuclear Deterrence and Containment 12 7
Th e thir d step called for by NSC-68 was th e developmen t of th e hydrogen bomb. As destructive as th e atomi c bom b was, a hydrogen bom b (or H-bomb) woul d be vastly mor e destructive. No w tha t th e Soviets ha d developed th e A-bom b muc h sooner tha n an - ticipated, the developmen t of th e H-bom b was deeme d necessary to maintai n nuclear de- terrence. Some policy makers believed tha t th e Unite d States shoul d pursu e nuclear arms-contro l agreements wit h th e Soviet Unio n befor e crossing this next threshol d of a nuclear arm s race. But NSC-68 dismissed th e prospec t of th e Soviets' being serious abou t arms-contro l negotiations.
NSC-68 was never formall y approved. Its recommendation s were tough, bot h strate- gically an d politically, an d thu s stirred debate withi n th e Truma n administration. All tha t debate becam e largely moot, though, whe n a few month s later th e Korean War brok e out. Ther e no w could be little doub t that, as President Truma n stated it, "communis m was act- ing in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, an d th e Japanese ha d acted 10,15, an d 20 years ear- lier."11 Th e Korean War lasted three years an d ende d largely in stalemate. Its lessons were mixed, on th e on e han d reinforcing th e view of th e communis t threat as globalized, while on th e othe r showing th e difficulties of land wars in Asia. It was also durin g this tim e tha t th e Unite d States first began getting involved in anothe r par t of Asia, Vietnam, sending
aid to th e French as they sough t to maintai n their colonial control against nationalist- communis t independenc e forces led b y H o Chi Minh.
Intensification, 1950s to the Early 1960s
Over th e rest of th e 1950s an d int o the 1960s th e Cold War intensified in virtually every global region. In Europe, West German y was brough t int o NATO, no t only to strengthe n th e NATO alliance, bu t also to address concerns roote d deep in Europea n historical mem - ories abou t Germany's rising again. In additio n to "keeping th e American s in" an d "th e Soviets out," by integrating German y int o th e U.S.-dominate d alliance, NATO also was in- tended, wit h World Wars I an d II in mind, to "keep th e German s down." 12 Th e Soviets' re- sponse, though, was to formalize their militar y alliance in Eastern Europ e throug h th e Warsaw Pact. Th e Soviets also demonstrate d their determinatio n to maintai n their bloc whe n in 1956 they invaded Hungar y to pu t dow n a political revolution tha t threatene d communis t control. Th e Soviet invasion left thousand s dea d an d even mor e imprisoned. Despite muc h rhetori c fro m Secretary of State John Foster Dulles abou t no t jus t th e con- tainmen t bu t th e "rollback" of communism, NATO an d th e Unite d States did nothin g sig- nificant t o aid th e Hungaria n freedo m fighters.
In 1952 th e Unite d States ende d th e military occupatio n it ha d maintaine d in Japan since th e en d of World War II. Defense agreements were signed for U.S. troop s an d bases to be maintaine d there, bot h to help defen d Japan an d as par t of th e overall containmen t strategy in Asia. Japan ha d by the n begu n functionin g as a democrac y unde r a constitu - tio n written largely by U.S. officials an d including provisions tha t renounce d war an d tha t
12 8 C H. 4 The Cold War Context: Origins and First Stages
permanentl y limited the size an d scope of th e Japanese military to "self-defense forces." Thu s as with Germany, th e U.S. strategy in Japan was to finish th e business of World War II an d start th e business of th e Cold War, in which these forme r US. enemies were no w U.S. allies against th e Soviet Union, China, an d world communism.
A s mentione d i n th e precedin g section, thi s perio d was also whe n th e Unite d States bega n its involvemen t i n Vietnam. Th e Unite d States provide d som e aid t o th e French, fo r who m Vietna m was still a colony, an d the n steppe d up its involvemen t followin g th e Frenc h defea t i n 1954. Th e America n concer n was no t onl y Vietna m itself: Vietna m was th e origina l case on whic h th e domin o theor y was based. "You have a ro w of domi - noe s set up," as Presiden t Eisenhowe r state d at a 1954 press conference. "You knoc k over th e first one, an d wha t will happe n to th e last on e is th e certaint y tha t it will go over very quickly. So yo u coul d have a beginnin g of a disintegratio n tha t woul d have
th e mos t profoun d influences." 13 Throughou t thi s perio d th e Unite d States got mor e
an d mor e involved in Vietnam. Also in Asia, th e Unite d States an d its allies created th e Southeas t Asia Treaty Organizatio n (SEATO), somewha t modele d afte r NATO, to be th e Asian link in th e chai n of alliances wit h whic h Eisenhowe r an d Dulles sough t to rin g th e globe.
In th e Middl e East, th e Baghdad Pact was set up in 1955; withi n a year it include d Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, an d Great Britain, wit h th e Unite d States as a de facto bu t no t a forma l member. Iraq withdre w fro m th e grou p in 1958 following a radical cou p against its monarchy; th e rest of th e alliance continued, albeit weakened, unde r th e title Centra l Treaty Organizatio n (CENTO). Containmen t was also manifeste d in Ira n in
1953 in th e U.S.-led covert action to brin g th e shah of Ira n back to powe r an d depose Prim e Ministe r Mohamme d Mossadegh, an d in Lebano n in 1958 wit h th e interventio n of U.S. Marine s in suppor t of th e pro-America n governmen t against its mor e radical do - mestic foes. Th e Lebano n case was mad e int o a mor e general precedent, unde r th e rubri c of th e Eisenhower Doctrine, of U.S. willingness to provid e militar y suppor t to any state in th e Middl e East against "overt arme d aggression fro m any natio n controlle d by inter - nationa l communism." 14
In Latin America, Cold War oppositio n to Soviet influenc e was cast as th e contem - porar y follow-u p t o th e Monro e Doctrine. Th e majo r challenge cam e i n Cub a i n
1958-5 9 wit h th e revolutio n led by Fidel Castro. As in Vietna m an d elsewhere, th e Cuba n revolutio n was a mi x o f nationalism, anti-imperialism, an d communism. Histo - rian s continu e t o debat e whethe r th e absolut e antagonis m tha t develope d betwee n Cas- tro's Cub a an d th e Unite d States was inevitable, o r whethe r som e modu s vivendi coul d have bee n worke d out. Whateve r chanc e ther e ma y have bee n fo r somethin g othe r tha n adversarial relations was gon e afte r th e disastrou s 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion. Th e Eisen- howe r administratio n planne d an d th e Kenned y administratio n launche d this covert project, in whic h th e Unite d States trained, supplied, an d assisted Cuba n exiles in an
Power: Nuclear Deterrence and Containment 129
attempte d invasio n o f Cub a aime d a t overthrowin g Castro. Th e invasio n faile d miser - ably, embarrassin g th e Unite d States, leavin g Castr o i n power, an d intensifyin g hatred s an d fear s o n bot h sides.*
A s fo r nuclear-deterrenc e doctrine, thi s perio d sa w a numbe r o f developments. Fo r a whil e th e Eisenhowe r administratio n pursue d th e doctrin e o f massive retaliation, b y whic h i t threatene d t o resor t t o nuclea r weapon s t o counte r an y Soviet challeng e any - wher e o f an y kind. Thi s doctrin e wa s no t ver y credible, though: I f a threa t wa s mad e an d delivere d on, ther e woul d b e nuclea r war; i f a threa t wa s mad e an d no t delivere d on, its credibilit y woul d b e undermined, a s i n th e case o f th e bo y wh o crie d wolf. I t also wa s quit e risky, especially a s th e Soviets kep t pac e wit h an d eve n seeme d poise d t o overtak e th e U.S. nuclea r program. Th e Soviets bea t th e American s int o spac e i n 1957 wit h th e launchin g o f th e Sputnik satellite. Tha t sam e yea r the y also teste d thei r first intercontinen - ta l ballistic missile (ICBM), whic h mean t tha t the y no w ha d th e capacit y t o overcom e larg e distance s an d reac h U.S. territor y wit h a nuclea r attack. Thi s led t o grea t fear s o f a "missil e gap," a Soviet advantag e i n nuclea r weapons, an d prompte d a massiv e U.S. nu - clear buildu p durin g th e Kenned y administration.
I n Octobe r 1962 th e Cuba n missil e crisi s brough t th e Unite d State s an d th e Sovie t Unio n t o th e brin k o f nuclea r war. 1 5 Th e Sovie t decisio n t o bas e nuclea r missile s i n Cub a wa s a darin g an d b y mos t account s reckles s move. Th e Soviet s defende d i t a s a n attemp t t o equaliz e th e imbalanc e cause d b y th e massiv e U.S. nuclea r buildu p unde r Kenned y an d b y th e stationin g o f U.S. nuclea r force s clos e t o Sovie t border s a t base s i n Turke y an d othe r NAT O countrie s i n Europe. Fo r its part, Cub a sa w thi s ne w Sovie t commitmen t a s a wa y t o guarante e tha t ther e woul d no t b e anothe r Ba y o f
Pig s invasion. Whateve r th e claims, th e effec t wa s t o tak e th e worl d dangerousl y clos e t o nuclea r war.
I n th e en d th e crisis wa s manage d effectively ^ Nuclea r wa r wa s averted. An d b y mos t assessments, especially a t th e time, i t wa s th e Soviets wh o backe d down, th e Unite d States tha t "won. " Bu t th e worl d ha d com e s o close—to o close—t o nuclea r war. Thus, althoug h man y sa w i n th e Cuba n an d Soviet action s tha t starte d th e crisis confirmatio n o f U.S. global-containmen t an d nuclear-deterrenc e doctrines, th e dangerou s dynamic s o f a situ - atio n tha t coul d hav e ha d catastrophi c consequence s drov e home, a s neve r before, th e risks o f th e Col d War.
" See p. 139 for further discussion of the Bay of Pigs as an example of flawed foreign policy decision-making. I See p. 140 for further discussion of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
13 0 C H. 4 The Cold War Context: Origins and First Stages
Principles: Ideologica l Bipolarit y
an d th e Thir d Worl d "ABC" Approac h
On e of th e primar y differences between th e Cold War an d othe r historical great-power struggles was tha t th e Cold War was no t just between rival nation s bu t also between op - posin g ideologies. This "ideological bipolarity " can be seen in th e Truma n Doctrine, th e Marshall Plan, an d man y othe r official pronouncements. There was no t muc h doub t then, an d there is even less now, abou t the evils of communism. Almost immediatel y after World War II, th e Soviets ha d show n in Poland an d elsewhere in Eastern Europe tha t they ha d little interest in allowing democracy. In this respect containmen t was consistent wit h America n principles. Th e controversy, though, was less abou t wha t th e United States op - posed tha n who m it supported, an d ho w it did so.
This wasn' t so muc h a proble m in Wester n Europe, wher e genuinel y democrati c leaders an d political partie s emerge d (althoug h in countrie s such as Italy, wher e th e Communis t part y ha d majo r electoral strength, th e CIA did covertly seek t o manipulat e elections). But quit e a few Thir d Worl d dictator s garbe d themselves in th e rhetori c of freedo m an d democracy, thoug h the y really fitte d only an "ABC" definitio n of democracy—"anythin g bu t communism. " On e doesn' t have t o b e s o naive a s t o expect th e Unite d States t o suppor t only regimes goo d a t hear t an d pur e i n practice. But th e ABC rational e was use d repeatedl y as if ther e coul d be only tw o options, th e commu - nists or th e othe r guy, whoeve r he migh t be an d whatever his political practices. More - over, th e criteria b y whic h leaders, parties, an d movement s were deeme d communis t were ofte n quit e subjective, if no t manipulative.
Support for "ABC Democrats"
Vietna m is a good example of th e U.S. suppor t for an "ABC" leadership. Ther e is muc h historical debate over whethe r a relationship could have been worked ou t wit h Ho Ch i Minh, th e Vietnamese leader wh o was bot h nationalist an d communist. H o ha d worked wit h th e Allies durin g World War II against th e Japanese occupatio n of Vietnam, even re- ceiving arm s an d aid fro m th e United States. After th e war he mad e appeals to Washing- to n fo r help, based on America's professed anticolonialism, against France's effor t to reestablish its ow n colonial rule. He even cited th e America n Declaration of Independ - ence in proclaimin g Vietnam's independenc e in 1945. There was no question tha t Ho was a communist; he believed in social revolution at hom e an d received suppor t fro m th e So- viet Unio n an d th e Chinese communists. Yet whe n som e experts suggested tha t as a na -
Principles: Ideological Bipolarity and the Third World "ABC" Approach 1 3 1
tionalist, an d like Tito i n Yugoslavia / H o woul d no t inevitably mak e his countr y a mer e communis t satellite, suc h thinkin g was summaril y rejected. I t wasn't s o muc h tha t ther e was evidence to th e contrar y as that, as pu t in a 1949 State Departmen t cable to th e U.S. consulat e i n Hanoi, th e "questio n o f whethe r H o was a s muc h nationalis t a s Commi e was irrelevant."16 Hi s communis m was all tha t mattered. Indeed, muc h later, Melvin Laird, wh o ha d bee n ardentl y pro-wa r while a Republica n congressma n in th e 1960s an d as sec- retary o f defens e i n th e Nixo n administration, acknowledge d tha t "ha d w e understoo d th e dept h o f his [Ho Ch i Minh's ] nationalism, w e migh t have bee n able t o derail his com - munis m early on." 17
Thu s th e Unite d States thre w its suppor t t o on e Vietnames e "ABC democrat " after an - other. In 1949, as thei r alternative to Ho Ch i Minh, th e French reinstalled Empero r Bao Dai. He was neithe r a democra t (he bor e th e title "emperor") no r a nationalis t (having sat o n th e thron e durin g th e Japanese occupatio n i n Worl d Wa r II) an d h e ha d little credibil- ity wit h his ow n people. Interna l State Departmen t document s showe d tha t Bao Da i was recognized as a Frenc h colonial puppet, bu t U.S. suppor t fo r hi m was rationalize d as th e onl y alternative t o "Commi e domination." 1 8
I n 1954 th e Vietnames e ha d wo n thei r war fo r independenc e an d th e French were forced t o withdraw. Two nations, Nort h an d Sout h Vietnam, were established, wit h H o an d the communist s i n contro l o f th e nort h an d th e anticommunist s i n contro l o f th e south. This partitio n was suppose d t o b e temporary, wit h unificatio n an d general elections t o b e held withi n a few years. In searching fo r someon e wh o could be built up as a nationalist al- ternative t o Ho, th e Eisenhower administratio n cam e u p wit h Ng o Din h Diem. Die m was not communist, bu t his "nationalist " credentials were mor e mad e i n Americ a tha n earne d in th e Vietnames e colonial struggles. He also was a Catholic in a largely Buddhis t country. Diem's rule was highly authoritarian—opposin g political parties were abolished, press censorship strictly enforced, Buddhist s brutall y repressed. He gave extensive powe r to his brothe r Ng o Din h Nhu, by mos t account s a shadow y an d sinister figure. Whe n a seventy- three-year-old Buddhis t mon k set himself o n fire t o protes t th e regime's repression, Nhu' s wife mad e a sneering remar k abou t Buddhis t "barbecues."19 Indeed, by 1963 Die m was so unpopula r tha t th e Kenned y administratio n ha d a han d i n th e cou p tha t brough t hi m dow n an d killed him. Thus, in this case th e cycle of contradictin g principles ra n its course—suppor t an ally in th e nam e of democrac y wh o is at best an ABC democrat, bu t kill hi m off whe n he clearly is no t th e solution, an d ma y even be par t of th e problem.
*)osip Broz, better known as Tito, was a communist who led the Yugoslav partisans against Nazi Germany and who became Yugoslavia's dictator after the war. In 1948, Tito broke with Stalin and the other members of the Warsaw Pact and began to develop independent ties to the West.
13 2 C H. 4 The Cold War Context: Origins and First Stages
In Latin America generally, U.S. policy in th e early Cold War was summe d up in th e commen t abou t suppor t for the Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza: "H e ma y be an S.O.B., bu t he's ou r S.O.B."20 Th e Alliance for Progress, established in 1961 by th e Kennedy administration, initially was heralded as a shift away fro m this approac h an d to- ward promotio n of democracy. "Ou r Alliance for Progress is an alliance of free govern- ments," President Kennedy proclaimed, "an d it mus t work to eliminate tyrann y fro m a hemisphere in which it has no rightful place."21 While JFK was pointin g his rhetorical fin- ger at Cuba an d Fidel Castro, the social an d economi c elites an d the militaries in muc h of th e rest of Latin America, seeing their ow n oligarchic interests threatened by political an d economi c reforms, undermine d "la Alianza." Military coups ousted reformist govern- ment s in th e early 1960s in Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Honduras, an d elsewhere. Al- thoug h th e cou p makers invoked anticommunis m an d containment, in most cases this was a transparen t rationalization. Yet th e United States largely bough t it. In fact, in th e case of Brazil, U.S. "enthusiasm" for th e cou p "was so palpable tha t Washington sent its con- gratulations even before th e ne w regime could be installed."22 Th e pro-America n (Power) stance of these regimes was mor e importan t tha n their being nondemocrati c (Principles).
To be sure, ther e were those wh o genuinely believed tha t communis m was so ba d tha t suppor t fo r "anybody bu t a communist " an d "anything bu t communism " was consistent wit h America n principles, at least in relative term s an d given an imperfec t world. On e of th e problem s wit h this defense, however, was th e inclusion of mor e moderat e socialists an d nationalists i n th e "irredeemabl e communists " category. This attitud e n o doub t was du e in par t to th e intolerance of ideological biopolarity: it recognized no thir d way. Th e ABC attitud e also reflected a calculation that, in th e event of conflicts between Power an d Principles in th e U.S. nationa l interest, Principles were to give way.
CIA Covert Action
Question s abou t consistency with Principles also were raised by CIA covert action seek- ing th e overthro w of anti-America n governments, including democratically chosen ones. A commissio n established by President Eisenhower provide d th e following recommen - dation: "Another importan t requiremen t is an aggressive covert psychological, political an d paramilitar y organization mor e effective, mor e unique, an d i f necessary, mor e ruth - less tha n tha t employed by th e enemy. No on e shoul d be permitte d to stan d in th e way of th e prompt, efficient an d secure accomplishmen t of this mission. It is no w clear tha t we are facing an implacable enemy.... Ther e are no rules in such a game. Hithert o accept- able norm s o f huma n conduc t d o no t apply."23
On e of th e cases in which this strategy was applied, in Guatemala in 1954, was dis- cussed in Chapte r 1 as an example of "4 Ps" tensions an d trade-offs. Anothe r case was tha t of Iran in 1953. In this case, as we saw earlier in this chapter, th e target was th e Iran - ian prim e minister Mohamme d Mossadegh, wh o ha d begu n bot h t o nationalize foreign-
Prosperity: Creation of the Liberal International Economic Order 13 3
owned oil companie s (Prosperity) an d to develop closer relations wit h th e Soviet Unio n (Power). Th e United States supporte d th e exiled shah, an d th e CIA assisted royalist forces i 11 a plot to retur n th e shah to power. Th e plot succeeded, albeit with a "wave of repres- sion" an d "a purg e of th e arme d forces an d governmen t bureaucracy " tha t "continue d fo r more tha n a year, silencing all sources of oppositio n to th e ne w regime." In th e years fol- lowing th e cou p th e CIA helpe d establish an d trai n th e shah's ne w secret police, know n as
SAVAK. Over th e next twent y to twenty-five years, SAVAK "becam e no t just an externally directed intelligence agency bu t also a powerful, feared an d hate d instrumen t of domesti c repression"—not exactly a practitione r of democrati c principles.24
Prosperity: Creatio n of th e
Libera l Internationa l Economi c Orde r
Along with th e dangers of isolationism an d appeasement, on e of th e othe r lessons tha t US. leaders ha d learned fro m th e 1920s an d 1930s concerned the dangers of trad e protection - ism an d othe r "beggar-my-neighbor " economi c policies. These policies hur t global pros- perity as well as tha t of th e United States. They also contribute d to th e political instabilities that ultimately led to World War II. Thu s on e of th e othe r majo r component s of postwar US. policy was th e creation of th e liberal international economic order (LIEO). Th e ter m "liberal" as used in this context mean s a relatively open, market-based, free-trad e system with a minimu m of tariffs an d othe r government-initiate d trad e barriers, an d wit h inter- national economi c relations worked ou t throug h negotiations. The opposite of liberalism in this context is no t conservatism, as in th e domestic-policy context, bu t protectionism.
The Major International Economic Institutions
As set up in th e 1940s, th e LIEO ha d three principa l components: (1) a free trad e system unde r th e rubri c of th e General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); (2) an interna - tional monetar y system, based on fixed exchange rates an d th e gold standard, an d over- seen by th e International Monetary Fund (IMF); an d (3) an internationa l lendin g an d aid system unde r th e Internationa l Bank fo r Reconstructio n an d Development, also know n as th e World Bank.
Th e establishment of GATT did no t brin g abou t instantaneou s free trade. Exceptions were made—fo r example, fo r agriculture, which fo r political an d othe r reasons was muc h harder to ope n up to free trade. There were loopholes, as fo r labor-intensive industries such as shoes an d textiles, which were allowed some, albeit no t total, protection. An d trad e disputes continued. Th e success of GATT was in keeping th e arro w pointe d in th e direction of free trade, in providin g a mechanis m for managin g trad e disputes so as to
13 4 C H. 4 The Cold War Context: Origins and First Stages
preven t their escalation to trad e wars, an d in movin g th e world gradually towar d freer trad e throug h periodi c "rounds " of negotiations.
Protectionis m ha d generated anothe r insidious practice: th e competitive manipula - tion s of currencies. Th e fixed exchange rates of th e IM F system sough t to eliminate this for m of destructive economi c competitio n an d help provide th e monetar y stability essen- tial for global economi c growth. Th e basic gold-standar d exchange rate was set at $36 per ounc e of gold. Countrie s whose internationa l payment s were no t in balance (i.e., they im - porte d mor e tha n the y exported) could get som e assistance fro m th e IM F bu t also ha d t o mee t stringent IM F guidelines called "conditionalities" for economi c an d othe r reform s in orde r to get tha t assistance.
Th e Worl d Ban k later woul d gro w int o a majo r sourc e o f developmen t aid fo r Thir d Worl d countries, bu t initially i t was focuse d mor e o n Europea n reconstruction. As of 1955, even thoug h th e U.S. Marshal l Pla n ha d ceased, abou t half of Worl d Ban k loan s wer e goin g t o industrialize d countries; b y 1965 thi s was dow n t o one-fourth, an d b y 1967 virtuall y all lendin g was going t o Thir d Worl d developmen t projects. Th e Worl d Ban k itself was chartere d t o len d onl y t o governments, bu t over tim e i t adde d a n affiliate, th e Internationa l Financ e Corporation, tha t mad e loan s t o privat e enter - prises involved in developmen t projects.
Critiques: Economic Hegemony? Neo-Imperialism?
Although in these an d other respects the LIEO did provide broad economic benefits interna- tionally, critics poin t ou t that it largely reinforced American economic dominance, or eco- nomic hegemony. Voting rights in bot h the IMF and the World Bank were proportiona l to capital contributions, which mean t that, as the largest contributor of funds, the United States ha d a correspondingly large voting share. In GATT negotiations, American positions pre- vailed mor e often tha n not. Indeed, the emphasis on free markets, open trade, an d minima l government intervention in the economy also fitted American laissez-faire economic ideol- ogy. And with Europe an d Japan still recovering an d rebuilding fro m World War II, the United States dominate d the world economy. Thus, even thoug h other countries benefited fro m the LIEO, it did also help maintain American economic hegemony to go with American diplomatic dominance and military superiority.
Anothe r critique point s to corporat e interests as driving U.S. policy. This poin t is ofte n stressed by revisionists in th e debate over th e origins of th e Cold War. Critics cite cases such as Guatemala, wher e U.S. policy followed th e interests of th e Unite d Fruit Company, an d Iran, wher e big oil companie s were eager to see th e shah restored to power, knowin g h e woul d retur n propert y t o the m tha t ha d bee n nationalize d unde r Mossadegh. Even in th e case of Vietnam, wher e intrinsi c U.S. economi c interests were mor e limited, th e fear was said to be of th e succession of communis t "dominoes " whos e fall woul d undermin e global capitalism. So, too, th e Marshall Plan is explained as an ef-
Foreign Policy Politics and the Cold War Consensus 13 5
for t t o rebuild Europea n market s i n orde r t o generate deman d fo r America n exports an d investments, thereb y overcomin g th e underconsumption-overproductio n dilemm a an d averting a depression. Th e deciding factor in th e formatio n of U.S. foreign policy, in this view, was th e private interests of multinationa l corporations, big banks, an d th e othe r captains of global capitalism.
Foreign Policy Politics and the Cold War Consensus
Th e mai n patter n in U.S. foreign policy politics durin g this period was th e "Cold War con- sensus." This consensus was marke d by three fundamenta l components: presidential domi - nance over Congress, a vast expansion of the executive-branch foreign an d defense policy bureaucracy, an d a fervent anticommunis m pervading public opinion, culminating in the scourge of McCarthyism.
Pennsylvania Avenue Diplomacy: A One- Way Street
Th e ter m spirit of bipartisanship was coined durin g this perio d to describe th e strong sup - por t fo r th e foreign policies of President Truman, a Democrat, fro m th e Republican- majorit y Congress, led by th e Senate Foreign Relations Committe e chair, Arthu r Vanden- berg. Wha t mad e this suppor t especially striking was th e extent of th e foreign commit - ment s being made—declarin g U.S. willingness "to suppor t free peoples everywhere" (the Truma n Doctrine), spendin g billions of dollars in foreign aid (the Marshall Plan), joinin g a militar y alliance durin g peacetime for th e first tim e in U.S. histor y (NATO)—all as a matte r of consensus an d presidential-congressional cooperation.
Before crumbling over th e Vietnam War in th e Johnson an d Nixon administrations, this foreign policy bipartisanship lasted throug h almost every conceivable Pennsylvania Avenue combination: a Democratic president supporte d by a Republican Congress (Truman,
1947-48), a Republican president supported by a Democratic Congress (Eisenhower,
1955-60), a Republican president an d a Republican Congress (Eisenhower, 1953-54), an d Democratic presidents an d Democratic Congresses (Truman 1949-52, Kennedy 1961-63, an d Johnson 1963 to about 1966). On e prominen t theor y of the day spoke of "one President bu t two presidencies": the domestic policy one, in which the president succeeded in getting his proposals throug h Congress only 40 percent of th e time, an d the foreign policy one, in which the president's success rate was 70 percent.25
On e of th e reasons fo r this presidential dominanc e was that, althoug h th e Cold War was no t a war per se, th e fearsom e natur e of th e Soviet threa t an d th e overhangin g dange r of nuclear war were seen as th e functiona l an d mora l equivalents of war. Given these exi- gencies, th e presidency ha d th e greater institutiona l capacity to conduc t foreign affairs.
160 C H. 4 The Cold War Context: Origins and First Stages
Onl y th e presidency possessed th e informatio n and expertise necessary for understandin g th e world, could mov e with th e necessary speed an d decisiveness in makin g key decisions, an d ha d th e will an d th e capacity to guard secrecy. Almost everywhere th e president went, th e "button " (the code box for orderin g a nuclear attack) went with him—an d it was con- ceivable tha t he woul d have less tim e to mak e a decision abou t whethe r to press it tha n it typically takes Congress just to have a quoru m call. For its part, Congress was seen as to o parochial to pay sufficient attentio n to world affairs, to o amateu r to understan d them, an d to o slow an d unwieldy in its procedures to respon d with th e necessary dispatch. Even its ow n foreign policy leaders ha d expressed strong doubt s abou t its foreign policy com - petence. Congress "has served us well in ou r internal life," wrote Senator J. William Ful- bright, th e longest-serving chair of th e Senate Foreign Relations Committe e in American history, bu t "the source of an effective foreign policy unde r ou r system is Presidential power." Fulbright went on to propos e tha t th e president be given "a measur e of power in th e conduc t of ou r foreign affairs tha t we [i.e., th e Congress] have hithert o jealously with- held."26 Fulbright's counterpart, Hous e Foreign Affairs Committe e Chair Thoma s (Doc) Morgan, went even further, saying tha t he ha d a "blanket, all-purpos e decision rule: sup - por t all executive branc h proposals."27
Three areas of foreign policy show ho w in th e basic relationship of separate institutions sharing powers, the presidency no w had the muc h larger share.
WAR POWERS In th e Korean War, Truma n never asked Congress fo r a declaratio n of war. H e claimed tha t th e resolution passed b y th e U N Security Counci l for "urgen t mili- tar y measure s... t o repel th e attack" provide d hi m wit h sufficient authorit y t o commi t U.S. troops. Moreover, this wasn't really a war, Truma n asserted, just "a police action." Ther e is little doub t tha t Congress woul d have supporte d th e presiden t wit h a declara- tio n of war if it ha d bee n asked. But in no t asking, Truma n set a ne w preceden t fo r pres- idential assertion of wa r powers. This "police action " lasted thre e years, involved a full-scale militar y mobilization, incurre d mor e tha n fift y thousan d America n casualties, an d ende d in stalemate.
In January 1951 Truma n announce d his intentio n to send th e first divisions of U.S. groun d troop s to be stationed in Europ e as par t of NATO. Here he argued tha t he was merely fulfilling internationa l responsibilities tha t Congress ha d previously approve d (in this instance by Senate ratification in 1949 of th e NATO treaty) an d thu s did no t nee d any furthe r congressional approval. Congressional oppositio n to th e NATO deploymen t was greater tha n in th e Korean War case bu t still was no t stron g enoug h to pass anythin g mor e tha n a nonbindin g resolution urging, bu t no t requiring, th e president to obtai n congres- sional approval for futur e NATO deployments.
Th e tren d continue d unde r President Eisenhower, althoug h wit h som e interesting twists. In 1955 a crisis was brewin g over threats by Chin a against Taiwan. Unlike Truman, Eisenhower did go to Congress for forma l legislative authorization, bu t he did so with a
Foreign Policy Politics and the Cold War Consensus 13 7
very open-ende d an d highly discretionary resolution authorizin g hi m t o use militar y force if an d whe n he deeme d it necessary as th e situatio n developed. This kin d of antici- pator y authorizatio n was very different fro m declaring war or taking othe r military ac- tio n against a specific country. Yet Eisenhower's request was approved by overwhelming margins, 83- 3 i n th e Senate an d 410- 3 i n th e House. Hous e Speaker Sam Raybur n (D-Texas) even remarked, "If th e President ha d don e wha t is propose d here withou t con- sulting Congress, he woul d have ha d no criticism fro m me." 28
In 1957 Eisenhower requested an d got a very similar anticipator y authorizatio n for a potentia l crisis in th e Middl e East. Her e th e concer n was Soviet gains of influence ami d increasing radicalism an d instability in a numbe r of Ara b countries. Yet once again by lopsided votes, Congress authorize d th e presiden t "to emplo y th e arme d forces of th e Unite d States as he deems necessary... [against] internationa l communism." 29
COVERT ACTION We fin d scattered examples of covert action throughou t U.S. history. In 1819, fo r example, President James Monro e too k covert action aime d against Spain in th e Spanish territor y of Florida an d kept it secret fro m Congress. In World War II th e Of - fice of Strategic Services (OSS) played a key role in th e war effort. But it was only wit h th e onset of th e Cold War tha t th e CIA was created as th e first permanen t intelligence agency in U.S. histor y an d tha t covert action was undertake n on a sustained, systematic basis.
Her e we see anothe r patter n of disproportionat e power sharing, an d again as muc h because of congressional abdicatio n as because of presidential usurpation. It was Con - gress tha t created th e CIA as par t of th e National Security Act of 1947 an d th e Centra l In- telligence Agency Act of 1949. Th e latter legislation include d a provision authorizin g th e CIA to "perfor m such othe r function s an d duties related to intelligence affecting th e na - tional security"—i.e., covert operations. Th e member s of congressional oversight com - mittees were charged wit h responsibility fo r keeping an eye on these covert operations. But mos t senators an d representatives wh o served on these committee s durin g th e early Cold War saw themselves mor e as boosters an d protector s tha n as checkers an d balancers. Th e "black budget " procedure, whereby fund s are appropriate d to th e CIA withou t its having to provid e virtually any details of its program s an d its accounts, was set up wit h a congressional win k an d nod.
INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS Another manifestation of presidential dominanc e was th e muc h greater use of executive agreements rather tha n treaties for makin g signifi- cant international commitments. 30 If we compare 1789 to 1945 with th e first three post-Worl d War II decades (1945-76), we see two majo r trends. On e is a hug e overall in- crease in U.S. international commitments, fro m 2,335 in th e one-hundred-fifty-plus-year period to 7,420 in the thirty-plus-year period, for annua l averages of 15 before 1945 an d 239 after. This skyrocketing overall numbe r demonstrates ho w muc h mor e extensive U.S. inter- national involvements ha d become. Second, a tren d within these number s shows mor e an d
13 8 C H. 4 The Cold War Context: Origins and First Stages
mor e frequent use of executive agreements rather tha n treaties. Whereas th e 1789-1945 breakdow n is 843 treaties an d 1,492 executive agreements (i.e., executive agreements as 64 percent of the total), for 1945-76 it was 437 an d 6,983 respectively (94 percent).31 This in- crease in the proportio n of U.S. commitment s represented by executive agreements shows ho w muc h presidents were trying to reduce Congress's role in the making of foreign policy.32
We do need to not e tha t man y executive agreements dealt with technicalities an d de- tails of relations an d were pursuan t to statutes passed by Congress, an d thu s som e of th e statistical difference is accounted fo r simply by th e sheer increase in technicalities an d de- tails tha t ha d to be worked out. But some of th e patter n is du e to th e fact that, th e greater the policy significance of th e issue, the mor e likely were Cold War-er a presidents to use ex- ecutive agreements rathe r tha n treaties. Military an d diplomatic matters, for example, were mor e tha n 50 percent mor e likely to take the for m of executive agreements tha n were eco- nomic, transportation, communications, or cultural-technical matters. Amon g th e signifi- cant political-military commitment s mad e by executive agreements were th e placement of U.S. troop s in Guatemala (1947) an d in mainlan d Chin a in suppor t of Jiang Jei-shi (1948); th e establishment of U.S. bases in th e Philippines (1947); th e sending of military missions to Hondura s (1950) an d El Salvador (1957); security pledges to Turkey, Pakistan, an d Iran
(1959); an d an expande d security commitmen t to Thailand (1962).33
In sum, Pennsylvania Avenue ha d pretty muc h becom e a one-way street in term s of foreign policy politics durin g th e first half of th e Cold War. Th e arro w pointe d dow n th e avenue, away fro m Capitol Hill an d toward th e Whit e House.
Executive-Branch Politics and the
Creation of the "National Security State"
To exercise his expanded powers the president needed larger, stronger, an d mor e numerou s executive-branch department s and agencies. Again, we can draw a parallel with th e expan- sions of th e executive branc h durin g World Wars I an d II. But this tim e th e expansion was even farthe r reaching an d longer lasting; it created th e "national security state."34
On e of th e first steps in this process was th e formatio n in 1947 of th e National Secu- rity Council (NSC). Th e original purpos e of th e NS C was to provide a forma l mechanis m fo r bringin g together th e president's principa l foreign policy advisers.* Th e NS C origi- nally ha d only a small staff, an d th e nationa l security adviser was a low-profile position.
*The standing members of the NSC were the president, the vice president, the secretary of state, and the secre- tary of defense. The national security adviser, the CIA director, and the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were technically defined as advisers. Depending on the issue at hand, other Cabinet officials such as the attorney general and the secretary of the treasury may also be included in NSC meetings. The same has been true for political officials such as the White House chief of staff.
Foreign Policy Politics and the Cold War Consensus 13 9
Few people can even nam e Truman's or Eisenhower's nationa l security advisers. But be- ginnin g in th e Kennedy administration, an d peaking wit h Henr y Kissinger in th e Nixon administration, th e nationa l security adviser becam e even mor e powerfu l an d prominen t tha n th e secretary of state in th e makin g of U.S. foreign policy.
Th e Department of Defense (DOD) was created in 1949 to combin e th e formerl y sep- arate Department s of War (created in 1789) an d th e Navy (separated fro m th e Depart - men t of War in 1798). Durin g World War II, th e Joint Chiefs of Staff ha d bee n set up to coordinat e th e military services. In 1947 th e position of secretary of defense was created, bu t each military service still ha d its ow n Cabinet-level secretary. But even this proved to b e inadequat e coordinatio n an d consolidation, an d th e DO D was established with th e army, navy, an d air force an d a newly created chair of th e Joint Chiefs of Staff all report - ing to th e secretary of defense, wh o by law ha d to be a civilian. Measured in term s of bot h personne l an d budget, DO D was an d is th e largest Cabinet department. An d its building, th e Pentagon, is th e largest governmen t office building.
Th e Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was also created durin g this period, as note d earlier in this chapter. In addition, a numbe r of othe r intelligence agencies were created, in- cluding the National Security Agency (1952) an d the Defense Intelligence Agency (1961).
Th e State Departmen t itself was vastly expanded. It grew fro m pre-Worl d War II lev- els of abou t on e thousan d employees in Washingto n an d two thousan d overseas to abou t seven thousan d an d twenty-thre e thousand, respectively. It also adde d ne w bureau s an d functions, notabl y th e Policy Plannin g Staff established in 1949 wit h George Kenna n ("X") as its first director, charged with strategic planning.
A numbe r of othe r foreign-policy-related agencies were also created durin g this time: the Economi c Cooperatio n Administratio n to administer th e Marshall Plan; th e Agency for Internationa l Developmen t (AID), in charge of distributing foreign aid; th e Arm s Con - trol an d Disarmamen t Agency (ACDA) to monito r an d negotiate arms-contro l agree- ments; the U.S. Informatio n Agency (USIA) to represent U.S. policies abroad; th e U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to conduc t international trade negotiations; an d others.
It again is importan t to stress tha t this vast expansion of the executive branc h was mad e largely wit h th e consen t of Congress. Som e presidents did exploit, manipulate, an d exceed th e intende d congressional mandates. But to appreciate fully th e politics of th e Cold War era, we nee d to take int o accoun t bot h seizings by presidential usurpatio n an d cedings by congressional abdication.
FLAWE D EXECUTIVE-BRANC H DECISIO N MAKING: TH E BA Y O F PIGS, 196 1 T h e
1961 Bay of Pigs debacle is on e of th e mos t ofte n cited cases of flawed executive-branc h decision making. 35 It involved a U.S.-engineered invasion of Cub a by exiled forces seeking to overthro w Fidel Castro. (Th e Bay of Pigs was wher e the y lande d on th e Cuba n coast.) No t onl y di d th e invasion fail miserably, bu t majo r question s were raised abou t ho w th e Kenned y administratio n could have believed tha t i t ha d any chanc e o f
14 0 C H. 4 The Cold War Context: Origins and First Stages
succeeding. Man y o f th e assumption s o n whic h th e pla n was based were exceedingly weak: fo r example, th e cover stor y tha t th e Unite d States played n o role i n th e invasion ha d already bee n contradicte d b y press report s tha t anti-Castr o rebels were bein g traine d b y th e CIA; an d th e planner s asserted tha t th e Cuba n peopl e were ready t o rise up, even thoug h it was less tha n two years since Castr o ha d com e to powe r an d he was still widely seen by his peopl e as a great liberator. Despit e these obviou s warnin g signs, a groupthin k dynami c dominate d th e policy-makin g process. Arthu r Schlesinger, Jr., a note d historia n an d at th e tim e a special assistant to Presiden t Kennedy, later explained tha t he felt tha t "a cours e of objectio n woul d have accomplishe d little save to gain me a nam e as a nuisance." 36
CIA intelligence failures also contribute d to th e Bay of Pigs fiasco. A repor t by th e
CIA's ow n inspector general, writte n in th e immediat e aftermat h bu t declassified only in
1998, stressed th e agency's "failure to subject th e project, especially in its latter frenzied stages, to a cold an d objective appraisal.... Timely an d objective appraisal of th e opera - tio n in th e month s before th e invasion, including stud y of all available intelligence, woul d have demonstrate d to agency officials tha t th e clandestine paramilitar y operatio n ha d al- mos t totally failed." Th e repor t also criticized th e "failure to advise th e President, at an ap- propriat e time, tha t success ha d becom e dubiou s an d t o recommen d tha t th e operatio n be therefor e cancelled."37 President Kennedy's ow n commen t summe d it up best: "Ho w could I have bee n so stupi d to let the m go ahead?" 38
SUCCESSFU L CRISI S DECISIO N MAKING: TH E CUBA N MISSIL E CRISIS, 196 2 O n th e
othe r hand, th e case mos t ofte n cited as a mode l of effective decision makin g is th e 1962
Cuban missile crisis.39 Having learned fro m th e Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy set up a process an d structur e tha t were mor e deliberate in their pace an d deliberative in their consideratio n of options. He went outside norma l bureaucrati c channels an d established a special crisis decision-makin g team, called ExCom, with member s draw n fro m his ow n Cabinet an d forme r high-rankin g foreign policy officials of previous administrations, such as Dean Acheson, secretary of state unde r Truman. Robert Kennedy also was a key player, an unusua l foreign policy crisis role fo r an attorne y general, bu t a logical on e for th e brothe r of th e president.
In on e sense th e reason tha t th e decision-makin g process worked so well in this case was tha t forma l structure s were adapte d an d modified. Th e ExCo m process gets muc h of th e credit fo r bringin g th e superpower s back fro m th e brin k o f nuclear war an d for th e successful resolution of th e crisis. President Kennedy himself also gets an importan t share of th e credit: no structur e like ExCo m can be established, no decision-makin g process functio n effectively, unless th e president provides th e mandat e an d th e leadership.
It also was ou t of th e Cuba n missile crisis tha t bureaucrati c politics an d othe r importan t theorie s of intra-executive-branc h politics were developed. Muc h of this was
Foreign Policy Politics and the Cold War Consensus 14 1
based on Graha m Allison's 1971 book, The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Mis- sile Crisis. 40 As recounte d an d analyzed by Allison an d others wh o followed, muc h of wha t transpire d durin g th e Cuba n missile crisis was quite inconsistent with th e traditiona l rational-acto r mode l (described in Chapte r 2 an d Reading 2.2) of hierarchical, orderly, an d structure d decision makin g an d policy implementation. Furthe r research has raised doubt s abou t a numbe r of th e case "facts" first stated by Allison.41 However, as Richard Betts notes, "other chilling examples have turne d up " of dangerously dysfunctiona l bu - reaucratic politics durin g this crisis.42 Bureaucratic problem s still were there, even if they were no t so ba d as originally depicted an d were ultimately transcende d by th e effective- ness of th e ExCo m structur e an d presidential leadership.
Interest Groups, the Media, and Public Opinion: Benefits and Dangers of Consensus
On th e on e han d there clearly are benefits whe n presidents are able to coun t on public, interest-group, an d even medi a suppor t fo r their foreign policies. But consensus, whe n taken to o far, also poses dangers an d has disadvantages.
THE MEDIA AS CHEERLEADERS Th e news medi a largely carried over their role as un - critical supporters, even cheerleaders, for official policy fro m World War II to th e Cold War. To th e extent tha t there was media criticism an d pressure, it was fo r th e president to take a toughe r stand. Indeed, th e news medi a played a significant role in th e shaping of Cold War attitudes. Man y give credit for coining th e ter m "Cold War" to Walter Lippmann, the leading newspaper columnist of th e day. Henr y Luce, owner an d publisher of Time an d Life, th e two leading newsmagazines, personally champione d South Vietnamese president Die m an d ensured favorable, even laudator y coverage for him. Even th e New York Times followed suit, as in a 1957 editorial titled "Die m on Democracy " in which th e editors hailed Die m for being so tru e to democrac y tha t "Thoma s Jefferson woul d have no quarrel."43
In th e Bay of Pigs case, th e medi a actually ha d prio r informatio n abou t th e planne d invasion bu t fo r th e mos t par t refraine d fro m publishin g it. Most o f wha t appeare d i n th e medi a abou t th e plan was "designed no t t o alert th e America n publi c t o th e potentially disastrous course of its ow n government, bu t to advance th e universally accepted propa - gand a line tha t Cub a unde r Castro was courtin g disaster."44 Althoug h som e of th e post - mortem s were self-critical, others were mor e "expressions of sadness tha t th e jo b was
'bungled,' tha t it did no t 'succeed'—an d tha t a well-meaning President got caught an d got a 'blood y nose.'"45 A few weeks after th e Bay of Pigs, an d despite his othe r acknowledge- ment s of responsibility, President Kennedy delivered a very stron g speech to th e Ameri - can Newspaper Publishers Association broadl y construin g th e nationa l security rationale as a constrain t on freedo m of th e press (see "At th e Source," p. 142).
14 2 C H. 4 The Cold War Context: Origins and First Stages
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