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This table compares U.S. an d Soviet success rates on votes in the UN General As- sembly fro m 1946 to 1960. Two sets of issues are disaggregated: Cold War issues and othe r internationa l affairs issues. On Cold War issues th e American position was supporte d in 94.3 percent of General Assembly votes, compare d with only 6.1 per - cent for the Soviet position. On othe r issues the margi n was closer bu t still favored the United States, 55.1 percent to 50.3 percent for successes and the even larger mar - gin of only 28.6 percent of votes that passed the General Assembly despite U.S. oppositio n but 40 percent for the Soviets (this takes abstention s into account). Th e overall scores were 60.3 percent success an d 25.3 percent failure for th e United States, and 44.5 percent success an d 47.2 percent failure fo r the Soviets.
Percentage of votes in the UN Genera l Assembly, 1946-60*
| UNITE D STATE S | SOVIE T | UNIO N | ||
| Success | Failure | Success | Failure | |
| Cold Wa r issues | 94.3% | 3.2% | 6.1% | 91.4% |
| Other issues | 55.1 | 28.6 | 50.3 | 40.0 |
| All issues | 60.3 | 25.3 | 44.5 | 47.2 |
^Differences from 100 percent are votes in which the United States and the Soviet Union abstained.
Source: Edward T. Rowe,"The United States, the United Nations and the Cold War," International Organization
25.1 (Winter 1971): 62.
was no t strong enoug h to en d th e global game of "spheres of influence... alliances... bal- ance of power " an d mak e th e brea k wit h tha t "unhapp y past" envisioned by Secretary of State Hull an d othe r UN founders. This was no t th e peace tha t was suppose d to be.
Power: Nuclea r Deterrenc e an d Containmen t
A "one world " peace ha d its attractions, bu t was unrealistic—power ha d to be me t with power. Some argued tha t this should have bee n foreseen even before World War II was over, and that FDR ha d conceded to o muc h at th e Yalta summi t on issues such as th e futur e
12 0 C H. 4 The Cold War Context: Origins and First Stages
of Poland. No w mor e tha n ever, in th e classic Realist dictu m presented back in Chapte r 1, American foreign policy had to be based on interests defined in term s of power.
For all the othe r differences that emerged over the course of th e Cold War, two basic doctrines of Power that developed in these early years remained th e core of U.S. foreign pol- icy. On e was nuclear deterrence. Bernard Brodie's Strategy in the Missile Age (Reading 4.2) was one of the first an d most influential books developing nuclear deterrence doctrine. Th e standard definition of deterrence is the prevention of attack throug h the fear of retaliation. On the one hand, deterrence is mor e than just the capacity to defend oneself sufficiently to prevent defeat. On the other hand, it is less tha n compellence, which mean s getting anothe r state to take a particular action that it otherwise would not. 8 Although the use of deterrence strategy goes far back in history, the nuclear age gave it greater centrality. As devastating as
the 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbo r had been, th e United States manage d to absorb it an d recover fro m it. But nuclear weapons, so muc h mor e destructive tha n anything the world ha d ever seen, changed th e world's security landscape. Th e single atomic bom b (A-bomb) droppe d on Hiroshima instantly killed 130,000 people, one-thir d of the city's population; anothe r 70,000 died later of radiation poisoning and other injuries. As the United States though t abou t its own national security in the nuclear age, its leaders realized tha t a strong an d resilient defense, thoug h still necessary, no longer was sufficient. Any at- tack with nuclear weapons or that could lead to th e use of nuclear weapons had to be de- terred before it began. This capacity for deterrence required a strong military, an d especially nuclear weapons superiority, an d also had political, psychological, an d perceptual dimen - sions. Th e deterrence "formula " was a combinatio n of capabilities an d intentions, bot h the capacity to retaliate an d th e will to do so. The requisites for meeting this nuclear deterrence formul a changed over time, bu t the basic strategy of preventing attack throug h fear of retal- iation stayed the same. Its development is a striking example of theor y shaping policy, as we elaborate in "Theor y in the World."
Containment was th e othe r basic doctrin e developed durin g th e early Cold War. In Februar y 1946, George F. Kennan, the n a high-rankin g U.S. diploma t in Moscow, sent a "long telegram" back to Washington, in which he sounde d th e alar m abou t th e Soviet Union. A version of th e lon g telegram later appeared in th e prestigious journa l Foreign Af- fairs as "Th e Sources of Soviet Conduct, " wit h authorshi p attribute d to an anonymou s "X" (Reading 4.3). Kennan's analysis of Stalin an d his Soviet Unio n was tha t "there can never be on Moscow's side any sincere assumptio n of a communit y of interests between th e Soviet Unio n an d powers which are regarded as capitalist." America n strategy there- fore ha d to seek th e "patient bu t fir m and vigilant containmen t of Russian expansive ten- dencies." Th e Soviet Unio n was seeking "to mak e sure tha t it has filled every noo k an d crann y available to it in th e basin of world power." Kennan recommende d a policy of "containment, " whereby th e United States woul d counte r any attemp t by th e Soviets to expan d their sphere of influence or to spread communis m beyon d their own borders. Onl y sustained containmen t ha d a chance of bringin g abou t "th e gradual mellowing of
Power: Nuclear Deterrence and Containment 12 1
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